Officer Use of Force and the Failure of Oversight of New York City Jails by Jennifer Ferentz
Fordham Urban Law Journal 
Volume 47 Number 5 Article 4 
2020 
Officer Use of Force and the Failure of Oversight of New York City 
Jails 
Jennifer Ferentz 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj 
Recommended Citation 
Jennifer Ferentz, Officer Use of Force and the Failure of Oversight of New York City Jails, 47 Fordham Urb. 
L.J. 1393 (2020). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol47/iss5/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The 
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact 
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 
1393 
OFFICER USE OF FORCE AND THE FAILURE OF 
OVERSIGHT OF NEW YORK CITY JAILS 
Jennifer Ferentz* 
Introduction ............................................................................ 1394 
I. Excessive Use of Force as an Intractable Problem ................. 1397 
A. Jails and a History of Violence ................................... 1397 
B. Judicial Intervention and Federal Monitorship .......... 1402 
C. Nunez v. City of New York and the Nunez Federal 
Monitorship ............................................................. 1405 
II. Mapping the New York City Jail System ............................. 1407 
A. The Department of Correction ................................... 1408 
B. New York City Government Oversight Agencies and 
Officials ................................................................... 1411 
i. Board of Correction .............................................. 1411 
ii. Office of the Mayor .............................................. 1413 
iii. New York City Council ....................................... 1415 
iv. Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings ...... 1417 
v. Department of Investigation ............................... 1418 
vi. Bronx District Attorney’s Office ......................... 1419 
C. New York State Oversight ......................................... 1420 
i. The State Commission of Correction ..................... 1420 
III. Oversight’s Abdication of Responsibility ........................... 1422 
A. “The System Is Overwhelmed” .................................. 1422 
B. No Minimum Standards ............................................. 1424 
C. Oversight’s Silence on the Use of Force ...................... 1426 
i. The Mayor and the Mayor’s Office of Criminal 
Justice ............................................................... 1426 
ii. New York City Council ........................................ 1428 
 
* I would like to thank the Fordham Urban Law Journal's editors and staff for their help 
through the writing process. Thank you also to Professor Nestor Davidson for his direction 
and encouragement, to Professor Aaron Saiger for his guidance, to Dean Diller for his 
mentorship, and to those who gave me such thoughtful feedback, including Bennett Stein. 
And of course to my family and friends: I could not have done this without your endless 
support. 
1394 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVII 
iii. Department of Investigation and District 
Attorneys ........................................................... 1429 
D. New York State Would Rather Play Politics ............. 1429 
E. Yet Another Oversight Hurdle: Office of Administrative 
Trials and Hearings’ Precedent ................................ 1431 
IV. Steps to Strengthen Oversight ............................................ 1431 
A. Board of Correction: Promulgate Minimum Standards, 
Make Funding Independent, Diversify Composition, and 
Broaden Enforcement Authority ............................. 1432 
B. Oversight Actors Should Be Connected ...................... 1434 
C. Move All Use of Force Investigations to Department of 
Investigation and Address Problematic Office of 
Administrative Trials and Hearings’ Precedent ........ 1435 
Conclusion ................................................................................ 1436 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Violence runs through the entirety of the U.S. criminal justice system, 
and it is a part of daily life in prisons and jails.  Two underlying reasons 
for this violence are that the modern U.S. carceral state is characterized 
by a “tough on crime” approach that prioritizes punishment over 
rehabilitation,1 and that it is built on the legacy of slavery and racism.2  
In prisons and jails,3 it is an accepted fact that correction officers will use 
 
 1. See Michael Jacobson et al., Beyond the Island: Changing the Culture of New York 
City Jails, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 373, 407–08 (2018). 
 2. See Race and the Criminal Justice System, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Oct. 1, 2014), 
https://eji.org/news/history-racial-injustice-race-and-criminal-justice/ 
[https://perma.cc/A3D8-V7PY]; see also Morris E. Lasker, Prison Reform Revisited: A 
Judge’s Perspective, 24 PACE L. REV. 427, 430–31 (2004). 
 3. Prisons are facilities that house people convicted of felonies who must serve more 
than one year and are usually run by the state or federal government. See Ellen Belcher, 
New York Prisons and Jails: Historical Research, JOHN JAY COLL. CRIM. JUST., LLOYD 
SEALY LIBR. (Aug. 3, 2020), https://guides.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/NYPrisons 
[https://perma.cc/9NXY-EUHH]. Jails are facilities that house pre-trial detainees — as 
well as people sentenced to under one year, waiting to be transferred to a prison, or being 
held on parole violations — and are usually run at the city or county level. See id. New 
York City jails also hold a large number of people for parole violations only. See 
Christopher Robbins, More and More People Winding up in NYC Jails for Technical Parole 
Violations, GOTHAMIST (Aug. 27, 2019, 5:02 PM), 
https://gothamist.com/news/more-and-more-people-winding-nyc-jails-technical-parole-vi
olations [https://perma.cc/W4M7-HY49]. The long-term effects of prisons and jails also 
vary widely. For example, in prison, long-term illness is the primary cause of death 
(88.3%); in contrast, in jail, 30.7% of deaths are by suicide. Compare E. ANN CARSON & 
MARY P. COWHIG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, MORTALITY IN STATE 
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some measure of physical force to control incarcerated people.4  Thus 
jurisdictions have different rules or policies that outline the bounds of 
what, when, and how much force is appropriate to use in various 
circumstances.5  However, our country is currently reckoning with the 
very idea of uniformed force;6 collectively, more people are beginning to 
understand that this force is synonymous with violence7 and that this 
violence is racialized.8 
U.S. prisons and jails are a “massive social institution plagued by 
problems,” and these problems are exacerbated “by the vacuum that 
 
AND FEDERAL PRISONS, 2001–2016 — STATISTICAL TABLES (2020), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/msfp0116st.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7WX-8SFZ], 
with E. ANN CARSON & MARY P. COWHIG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, 
MORTALITY IN LOCAL JAILS, 2001–2016 — STATISTICAL TABLES (2020), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mlj0016st.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z57J-KTBK]. 
 4. See John Boston, Excessive Force and New York City Jails: Litigation and Its 
Lessons, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 155, 167 (2006) (stating “the use of force can never be 
eliminated entirely, but prisons and jails can be managed with a minimal amount of 
physical force”). 
 5. See, e.g., N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CORR., DIRECTIVE NO. 5006R-D: USE OF FORCE (2017), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doc/downloads/directives/Directive_5006R-D_Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H2NM-54FD] (stating the “Use of Force is any instance where Staff use 
their hands or other parts of their body, objects, instruments, chemical agents, electronic 
devices, firearms, or any other physical method to restrain, subdue, or compel an Inmate 
to act or stop acting in a particular way. The term ‘Use of Force’ does not include moving, 
escorting, transporting, or applying restraints to a compliant Inmate”). The U.S. 
Constitution also sets boundaries for the amount and type of force officers may use in the 
corrections setting; however, this standard “[grants] wide latitude to . . . officers,” as a 
finding of malicious or sadistic intent is needed to violate the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Boston, supra note 4, at 160. 
 6. See Derrick Johnson, The George Floyd Uprising Has Brought Us Hope. Now We 
Must Turn Protest to Policy, GUARDIAN (June 30, 2020, 6:27 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jun/30/black-lives-matter-protests-vo
ting-policy-change [https://perma.cc/DD7S-MYLY]. 
 7. See, e.g., Catherine E. Shoichet, Protests Are Erupting over Police Brutality. And 
Some Officers Are Responding to the Outcry with Force, CNN (June 5, 2020, 1:18 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/02/us/police-protests-use-of-force/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/2PE8-PB82]. 
 8. See Bryan Stevenson, Slavery Gave America a Fear of Black People and a Taste for 
Violent Punishment. Both Still Define Our Criminal Justice System, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 
14, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/prison-industrial-complex-sl
avery-racism.html [https://perma.cc/DYU5-EAKA]; see also VERA INST. OF JUST., 
INCARCERATION TRENDS IN NEW YORK (2019), 
https://www.vera.org/downloads/pdfdownloads/state-incarceration-trends-new-york.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T866-JCY2] (establishing that despite making up only 19% of the New 
York State population, Black people make up 43% of people in jail and 48% of people in 
prison). 
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exists when it comes to meaningful oversight and public accountability.”9  
And this vacuum exists here in New York City.  This Note asks the reader 
to consider: what is the point of government oversight if one of the most 
pressing issues incarcerated people face today — the intractable problem 
of unnecessary and excessive officer use of force — goes ignored by such 
oversight?  This Note examines the larger structure of oversight of New 
York City jails10 to try to understand how the use of force rate continues 
to increase despite ongoing federal Monitorship, and the Department of 
Correction’s alleged commitment to change.  Ultimately, this Note argues 
the actors responsible for changing the rules governing New York City 
jails and the practices carried out within them are abdicating that 
responsibility when it comes to this violence. 
Part I traces the history of brutality in New York City jails and focuses 
on the work of prisoners’ rights advocates and judicial intervention on 
this issue, which culminated in the lawsuit Nunez v. City of New York.11  
Part II then seeks to identify and document the institutional actors’ legal 
authority that play a role in the functioning and oversight of New York 
City jails, focusing on how these entities can impact excessive use of force.  
Part III examines both the current state of correction officer use of force 
in City jails and oversight actors’ reaction to this issue within the past few 
years.  This Part demonstrates both how the Department of Correction 
(DOC) is ill-equipped to change, and how oversight bodies with legal 
authority to make a difference have remained mostly silent.  Finally, Part 
 
 9. Michele Deitch & Michael B. Mushlin, Let the Sunshine In: The ABA and Prison 
Oversight, STATE OF CRIM. JUST. 243, 244 (2011). 
 10. This Note does not include jails that hold people in federal pre-trial detention or 
custody. The facilities this Note refers to as “New York City jails” are Brooklyn Detention 
Complex (closed in January 2020), Manhattan Detention Complex, Vernon C. Bail 
Correctional Center, and facilities on Rikers Island (Anna M. Cross Center, Eric M. Taylor 
Center, George Motchan Detention Center, George R. Vierno Center, North Infirmary 
Command, Otis Bantum Correctional Center, Robert N. Davoren Complex, Rose M. 
Singer Center, and West Facility). This understanding excludes Bellevue Hospital Prison 
Ward and Elmhurst Hospital Prison Ward, which are under the shared jurisdiction of the 
Department of Correction and NYC Health and Hospitals Corporation, and come with 
their own set of challenges like unique barriers to access compassionate healthcare. The 
Manhattan Detention Complex is colloquially known as “the Tombs,” and Vernon C. Bail 
Correction Center is known as “the Boat.” See Kim Kelly, At the Center of the Coronavirus 
Pandemic, People Inside NYC Jails Describe Fear, Confusion and a Lack of Supplies, 
APPEAL (Apr. 8, 2020), https://theappeal.org/new-york-city-jails-coronavirus-covid-19/ 
[https://perma.cc/3G37-LSMP]. 
 11. See Complaint, Nunez v. City of New York (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11 Civ. 5845) 
[hereinafter Nunez Complaint], 
https://www.legalaidnyc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Nunez-Complaint.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JU24-DXTK]. 
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IV recommends several policy changes to strengthen oversight over New 
York City jails, and tackle the central and ubiquitous problem of 
excessive use of force. 
I. EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE AS AN INTRACTABLE PROBLEM 
Section I.A traces the entrenched history of violence in New York City 
jails, with a particular emphasis on Rikers Island.  Section I.B then 
outlines the efforts of prisoners’ rights advocates to ensure the safety and 
well-being of incarcerated people through judicial intervention and 
Monitorship.  Finally, Section I.C focuses on the lawsuit Nunez v. City of 
New York,12 the ongoing reports the Nunez Federal Monitor publishes, 
and the current status of New York City jails, including the continued 
prevalence of correction officers’ unnecessary and excessive use of force. 
A. Jails and a History of Violence 
New York City jails, in particular Rikers Island, have always been 
notorious for violence.13  Although gang-related conflict in jail is 
prevalent,14 brutality carried out by correction officers in City jails is also 
an intrinsic part of this violence.15  Correction officers have dragged an 
inmate by the neck, handcuffed, and punched the inmate in the face;16 in 
a gang of three, kicked and punched a man in the stomach;17 beaten 
inmates after forcing them to strip naked;18 forced inmates to eat 
cigarettes and flushed their heads in toilets;19 kept a man in a cell with no 
running water for two days, and then hit him in the face when he asked 
 
 12. Id.  
 13. See Jacobson et al., supra note 1, at 381 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., U.S. ATT’Y’S 
OFF. FOR THE S. DIST. OF N.Y., CRIPA INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION JAILS ON RIKERS ISLAND 3 (2014), 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/not_public/JC-NY-0062-0001.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q4Q5-BW8B]). 
 14. See generally This Is Rikers: From the People Who Live and Work There, MARSHALL 
PROJECT (June 28, 2015, 9:00 PM) [hereinafter MARSHALL PROJECT], 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/06/28/this-is-rikers 
[https://perma.cc/H4J3-CUFG]. 
 15. See Nunez Complaint, supra note 11, at 5. 
 16. See Fisher v. Koehler, 692 F. Supp. 1519, 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (discussing 
plaintiff James Kenny). 
 17. See id. at 1534 (discussing plaintiff Keith Beattie). 
 18. See Stipulation of Settlement at 4, Sheppard v. Phoenix (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (No. 91 
Civ. 4148). 
 19. See id. at 11. 
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for water;20 and pepper-sprayed someone as he lay face down in the 
shower after another officer hit him in the back of the head so hard he lost 
consciousness.21  Formerly-incarcerated people have also spoken about 
the horrors they experienced in these jails beyond this brutality, which 
include no access to cold water or cold showers on scorching hot summer 
days,22 mice and cockroach infestations in cells, and a lack of access to 
necessary and life-saving medication.23  Since facilities were first built on 
Rikers Island, DOC’s actions have prompted lawsuits that allege 
organizational indifference to these problems and overwhelming 
mismanagement.24 
In 1884, New York City bought Rikers Island from the Riker family, 
with plans to expand its size and build a prison facility to relieve the 
overcrowding and squalid conditions present in the City’s two operating 
jails.25  Opened in the 1930s, the Rikers Island Penitentiary was accessible 
only by ferry, and the people incarcerated there lived next to garbage 
dumped by the Department of Sanitation,26 despite the City’s intention 
for it to be on the cutting edge of penitentiary design.27  By 1939, a Bronx 
 
 20. See Ingles v. City of New York, 2003 WL 402565, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing 
plaintiff Ed Sykes). 
 21. See Nunez Complaint, supra note 11, at 42–45 (discussing Plaintiff Rodney Byre). 
 22. See Raven Rakia, A Sinking Jail: The Environmental Disaster That Is Rikers 
Island, GRIST (Mar. 15, 2016), 
https://grist.org/justice/a-sinking-jail-the-environmental-disaster-that-is-rikers-island/ 
[https://perma.cc/MJX3-NACS]. 
 23. See MARSHALL PROJECT, supra note 14. 
 24. See Section I.C; see also Jarrod Shanahan, When Incarceration Kills, JACOBIN (Aug. 
8, 2019), 
https://jacobinmag.com/2019/08/life-and-death-in-rikers-island-review-book-prison-jail-h
omer-venters [https://perma.cc/BT9J-XD7U]. 
 25. See John Surico, How Rikers Island Became the Most Notorious Jail in America, 
VICE (Jan. 11, 2016, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/dp59yq/how-rikers-island-became-the-most-notoriou
s-jail-in-america [https://perma.cc/7C9X-9GXM]. The patriarch of the family, Richard 
Riker, used his position as a criminal court municipal officer to label free African 
Americans as “fugitive slaves” to get kickbacks from kidnappers who sold them into 
slavery. See id. 
 26. In 1938, the State Commission of Correction commented on the “anomalous 
situation” of having a $10 million penitentiary located in the middle of a municipal dump. 
See Riker’s Island Use as Dump Denounced, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 1938), 
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1938/11/27/99570997.html?pageNumb
er=13. 
 27. See Jarrod Shanahan, Captives of a New Alcatraz: The New York City 
Department of Correction from 1954 to 1990 (2019) (Ph.D. dissertation, City University 
of New York) (on file with author); see also New Prison Ready on Riker’s Island, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 30, 1935), 
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court deemed it to be “nearly unlivable.”28  Regardless, the City’s use of 
Rikers Island kept growing, leveling out the garbage piles,29 and building 
new facilities in the 1960s and 1970s.30  In 1974, in response to a class 
action brought by the Legal Aid Society, a court ordered the temporary 
shut-down of a jail near City Hall in Manhattan, known colloquially as 
the Tombs, for its poor living conditions;31 after this, DOC started to 
house increasingly more detainees on Rikers Island.32 
The prevalence of drug use and an increased reliance on policing in the 
1980s meant that Rikers Island housed an ever-ballooning population of 
detainees; under Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, the Rikers population 
skyrocketed in the early 1990s.33  For example, in 1991, around 22,000 
people were held in DOC custody.34  To handle the overflow, DOC set up 
tents and navy barges to house people35 — one of which, nicknamed the 
Boat, still operates today.36  Although the New York City jail population 
reached its peak around 30 years ago and crime rates have steadily fallen 
since then, City jail facilities’ problematic conditions, prevalence of 
violence, and correction staff’s persistent corruption have never gone 
away.37 
 
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1935/06/30/95507721.html?pageNumb
er=21. 
 28. Surico, supra note 25. 
 29. See Rakia, supra note 22. 
 30. See Surico, supra note 25. 
 31. See Jacobson et al., supra note 1, at 385–86. 
 32. See Janos Marton, #CloseRikers: The Campaign to Transform New York City’s 
Criminal Justice System, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 499, 510 (2018). 
 33. See Surico, supra note 25. 
 34. See Marton, supra note 32, at 520. 
 35. See id. at 512. 
 36. See Matthew Haag, A Floating Jail Was Supposed to Be Temporary. That Was 27 
Years Ago., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/10/nyregion/nyc-jail-barge-rikers.html 
[https://perma.cc/5PGC-JYCW]. 
 37. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., U.S. Att’y’s Off. for the E. Dist. of 
N.Y., Six New York City Correction Officers and 15 Others Charged with Conspiring to 
Accept Bribes and Smuggle Contraband into Rikers Island Facilities (Jan. 14, 2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/six-new-york-city-correction-officers-and-15-other
s-charged-conspiring-accept-bribes [https://perma.cc/JM49-68FY]; Brian Sonenstein, 
New York City Inspectors Smuggle Contraband into Jail, Find Culture of Corruption Live 
and Well, SHADOWPROOF (Feb. 14, 2018), 
https://shadowproof.com/2018/02/14/nyc-doc-contraband-inspectors-undercover-corrupti
on/ [https://perma.cc/ZR68-CZ79]; see also Surico, supra note 25 (discussing the 
entrenched culture of misogyny, cruelty, and illegality in correction officers taking 
foothold in the 1980s). 
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After years of activism concentrated into the #CloseRikers 
campaign,38 in conjunction with the momentum built by allegations of 
pervasive brutality in the lawsuit Nunez v. the City of New York39 — 
which was joined by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New 
York40 — Mayor Bill de Blasio announced that his Administration would 
officially close Rikers Island.41  His Administration eventually laid out an 
$8 billion plan42 to construct a “smaller network of modern jails” in four 
boroughs.43  The New York City Council officially endorsed this plan in 
October 2019 by voting to close Rikers Island by 2026.44  Ultimately, this 
borough-based plan depends on shrinking the jail population 
substantially to around 3,300 from approximately 7,000 in 2019.45  Bail 
 
 38. See generally Marton, supra note 32. 
 39. See discussion infra Section I.C. 
 40. See United States’ Proposed Complaint-in-Intervention, Nunez v. City of New 
York (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 11 Civ. 5845). The Southern District of New York intervened 
in the underlying class action lawsuit after releasing a Civil Rights of Institutionalized 
Persons Act (CRIPA) investigation report, which found that there was an 
unconstitutional pattern and practice of violence on Rikers Island for incarcerated people 
under the age of 18. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., U.S. Att’y’s Off. for the S. Dist. 
of N.Y., Department of Justice Takes Legal Action to Address Pattern and Practice of 
Excessive Force and Violence at Rikers Island Jails That Violates the Constitutional 
Rights of Young Male Inmates (Dec. 18, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/department-justice-takes-legal-action-address-pat
tern-and-practice-excessive-force-and [https://perma.cc/MC59-HAE7]. 
 41. See Joel Rose, Rikers Island Could Be Closed and Replaced with Smaller Jails Around 
New York City, NPR (Mar. 31, 2017, 7:36 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/03/31/522251063/rikers-island-could-be-c
losed-and-replaced-with-smaller-jails-around-new-york-ci 
[https://perma.cc/XXM6-ZJDM]. 
 42. See Matthew Haag, N.Y.C. Votes to Close Rikers. Now Comes the Hard Part., N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 17, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/nyregion/rikers-island-closing-vote.html 
[https://perma.cc/59VP-C2CC]. 
 43. CITY OF N.Y., OFF. OF THE MAYOR, SMALLER SAFER FAIRER: A ROADMAP TO 
CLOSING RIKERS ISLAND 7 (2017), 
https://rikers.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/Smaller-Safer-Fairer-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RAW7-X3LR]. 
 44. See Rikers to Close, N.Y. CITY COUNCIL, https://council.nyc.gov/data/closerikers/ 
[https://perma.cc/5JG3-X9UD] (last visited Aug. 21, 2020). New York City Council’s vote 
included a set of reforms to the Minimum Standards for the treatment of incarcerated 
people and design outlines for any new jails built. See Ben Chapman, New York City 
Council Proposes a Plan for Jails after Rikers, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2019, 6:37 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-city-council-proposes-a-plan-for-jails-after-rikers
-11570055867. 
 45. See Bobby Cuza, City Hall: Jail Population Expected to Drop to 3,300 by 2026, NY1 
(Oct. 14, 2019, 9:19 PM), 
https://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/politics/2019/10/15/nyc-jail-population-expected-
to-drop-to-3300-by-2026-city-hall-says [https://perma.cc/SC9X-6EJ9]. 
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reform laws that prohibit the use of cash-bail for the majority of arrests 
are critical to reducing the jail population; however, those that went into 
effect on January 1, 2020 — which had the potential to impact 
approximately 43% of all people held in pre-trial detention46 — were 
amended by the state legislature only three months later.47  The 
three-month impact of the original law led to a drop in pre-trial detainees 
across New York State,48 and the effect of the revision may not actually 
be that substantive.49  It is undeniable, though, that COVID-19 hit New 
York City particularly hard in March and April of 2020, leading activists 
and lawyers to demand the release of people in custody.50  Further, the 
Board of Correction (BOC or the Board) urged the City to rapidly reduce 
its jail population.51  Releasing certain categories of people did become 
part of the City’s public health response to the pandemic, and as of April 
2020, DOC reduced its jail population to just under 4,000 people.52  
 
 46. See MICHAEL REMPEL & KRYSTAL RODRIGUEZ, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, BAIL 
REFORM IN NEW YORK: LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW YORK 
CITY 8 (2019), 
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/document/2019/Bail_Reform_
NY_full_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HPT-V4EA]. 
 47. See Taryn A. Merkl, New York’s Latest Bail Law Changes Explained, BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 16, 2020), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/new-yorks-latest-bail-law-cha
nges-explained [https://perma.cc/X4F3-7Q3B]. 
 48. See Jamiles Lartey, New York Rolled Back Bail Reform. What Will the Rest of the 
Country Do?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 23, 2020, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/04/23/in-new-york-s-bail-reform-backlash-a-ca
utionary-tale-for-other-states [https://perma.cc/BQA6-6YH3]. 
 49. See Merkl, supra note 47. See generally MICHAEL REMPEL & KRYSTAL RODRIGUEZ, 
CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, BAIL REFORM REVISITED (2020), 
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/document/2020/bail_reform_re
visited_05272020.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JN2-MAVX]. 
 50. See Josiah Bates, Campaigns, Fundraisers Work to Bail New York City Inmates 
Amid COVID-19 Outbreaks in Jails and Detention Centers, TIME (Apr. 17, 2020, 5:23 PM), 
https://time.com/5821512/bail-campaigns-new-york-inmates-coronavirus/ 
[https://perma.cc/6WXN-2FKQ]. 
 51. See Press Release, N.Y.C. Bd. of Corr., New York City Board of Correction Calls 
for City to Begin Releasing People from Jail as Part of Public Health Response to 
COVID-19 (Mar. 17, 2020), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/boc/downloads/pdf/News/covid-19/2020.03.17%20-%20Boa
rd%20of%20Correction%20Statement%20re%20Release.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XRC8-X3SS]; see also Letter from Jacqueline Sherman, Interim Chair, 
N.Y.C. Bd. of Corr., to New York City’s Crim. Just. Leaders (Mar. 21, 2020), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/boc/downloads/pdf/News/covid-19/Letter-from-BOC-re-NY
C-Jails-and-COVID-19-2020-03-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3S6-2TL2]. 
 52. Press Release, Off. of the Mayor, City Jail Population Drops Below 4,000 for First 
Time Since 1946 (Apr. 21, 2020), 
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However, the overall effect of this historical moment on City jails — as 
with all aspects of City life — remains uncertain. 
B. Judicial Intervention and Federal Monitorship 
The history of institutional reform litigation and the legacy of the 
prisoners’ rights movement are key to understanding the modern 
administration of jails and how the U.S. government has come to 
institutionally recognize the fundamental rights of incarcerated people.  
The era of this litigation began with Brown v. Board of Education, which 
opened the federal courts to a new type of injunctive relief and civil rights 
enforcement.53  In the 1970s, incarcerated people led wide-spread 
uprisings, and the backlash in response rippled throughout the country.54  
In 1974, the Supreme Court declared “[t]here is no iron curtain drawn 
between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.”55  That same 
year, in New York City, the District Court for the Southern District of 
New York ordered the Tombs to be closed, ending a class action litigation 
brought by the Legal Aid Society.56  Litigation in the 1980s then boomed, 
brought by both prisoners’ rights lawyers and incarcerated people 
themselves; by 1993, incarcerated people had filed 19% of the cases on the 
federal docket.57 
This momentum then faced two major hurdles.  First, the Supreme 
Court took a turn in its jurisprudence by “radically enlarging the scope of 
deference accorded to prison administrators,” ultimately deeming “even 
objectively brutal treatment” constitutional.58  Second, Congress and 
 
https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/278-20/city-jail-population-drops-below
-4-000-first-time-since-1946 [https://perma.cc/U9DN-FSQG]. 
 53. See Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time: A Case Study of Jail and 
Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 552 (2006). 
 54. See Michael Mushlin & Naomi Roslyn Galtz, Getting Real About Race and Prisoner 
Rights, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 27, 32 (2009); see also Michael Avery, Book Review: Blood 
in the Water: The Attica Prison Uprising of 1971 and Its Legacy, NAT’L LAWS.’S GUILD: 
REV., 
https://www.nlg.org/nlg-review/article/book-review-blood-in-the-water-the-attica-prison
-uprising-of-1971-and-its-legacy/ [https://perma.cc/EDT3-ASKS] (last visited Sept. 17, 
2020) (discussing the Attica uprising and the abject cruelty of the government’s response). 
 55. Deitch & Mushlin, supra note 9, at 243 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 
555–56 (1974)). Under traditional jurisprudence, incarcerated people were considered 
“slaves of the state.” Mushlin & Galtz, supra note 54, at 32. 
 56. See Jacobson et al., supra note 1, at 385–86. 
 57. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1558 (2003). 
 58. See Mushlin & Galtz, supra note 54, at 32; see also, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 
294, 302–03 (1991) (stating that for conditions of confinement within the carceral setting 
to violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, 
correction officers’ intention — not the conditions — are key. Officers must be deliberately 
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President Bill Clinton passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),59 
which severely restricted incarcerated people’s access to federal courts.60  
The PLRA was designed “with the express purpose of reducing prison 
litigation,” and created procedural hurdles.61  For example, the PLRA 
contains a “three strikes” provision, which mandates that if an 
incarcerated person sues and loses in three separate federal suits, he or she 
is barred from bringing any suit in forma pauperis, even if an unsuccessful 
lawsuit was the result of a failure to state a viable claim.62  Also, the 
PLRA requires incarcerated people to exhaust all available 
administrative remedies, like the jail’s grievance system,63 before seeking 
redress in a court, no matter how opaque or dysfunctional the 
administrative procedure may be.64  Finally, PLRA provisions that 
“restrict the scope of consent decrees . . . and reduce the amount of 
attorneys’ fees that may be recovered when prisoner plaintiffs prevail,” 
along with the exhaustion requirement, make building class action 
lawsuits monumentally harder.65  Still, prisoners’ rights litigation’s legacy 
has ensured there are uniform standards for staff behavior and conditions 
of confinement for incarcerated people.66 
Litigation in New York City is a part of this history, and despite the 
PLRA, four federally appointed Monitors remain active in overseeing 
New York City jails.67  A Monitor is an independent person or 
 
indifferent or wonton in their conduct); Turner v. Safley, 428 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (holding 
regulations that impinge on incarcerated people’s constitutional rights need only be 
“reasonably related to legitimate penological interests”). 
 59. 42 U.S.C. § 1997. 
 60. See David M. Shapiro & Charles Hogle, The Horror Chamber: Unqualified Impunity 
in Prison, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2021, 2048 (2018). 
 61. See Mushlin & Galtz, supra note 54, at 35. 
 62. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Being able to bring a suit in forma pauperis means a person 
can submit an affidavit stating they are unable to pay court-related fees in lieu of payment 
to the court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). 
 63. See, e.g., N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CORR., DIRECTIVE NO. 3376R-A: INMATE GRIEVANCE 
PROCEDURES 11–20 (2018), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doc/downloads/directives/Directive_3376R-A.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FDY8-VSAL]. 
 64. See Rachel Poser, Why It’s Nearly Impossible for Prisoners to Sue Prisons, NEW 
YORKER (May 30, 2016), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-its-nearly-impossible-for-prisoners-to-
sue-prisons [https://perma.cc/5BZ3-CVQ2]. 
 65. See Mushlin & Galtz, supra note 54, at 35. 
 66. See Malcolm M. Feeley & Van Swearingen, The Prison Conditions Cases and the 
Bureaucratization of American Corrections: Influences, Impacts and Implications, 24 PACE 
L. REV. 433, 442–43 (2004). 
 67. See Stephen Rex Brown & Reuven Blau, Decades of Federal Oversight of City 
Correction Department Hasn’t Yet Fixed Myriad Jail Woes, DAILY NEWS (Dec. 16, 2018), 
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organization that oversees the execution and compliance with a consent 
judgment, or consent decree, which is a court-approved settlement signed 
by all parties to a suit.68  As the DOC is the defendant organization in 
lawsuits aimed at reforming City jails, Monitors actively engage with 
DOC through investigation and on-the-ground support, and will regularly 
make suggestions and publish reports to the court overseeing the 
litigation.69  The longest Monitor over DOC, established under Benjamin 
v. Fraser, has been active since 1982.70  Although the Consent Judgement 
was scaled back in 2003, DOC must still comply with ventilation, lighting, 
and temperature standards under the Benjamin Monitorship.71  Until 
recently, a second Monitor kept track of DOC’s compliance with the 
Consent Judgement under Handberry v. Thompson,72 which stemmed 
from a class action filed in 1996 against the City, DOC, and the 
Department of Education.  A third Monitor oversees discharging 
practices for people from jail with mental illnesses.73  Finally, the fourth 
Monitorship, the Nunez Monitor, has been active since 2015 and addresses 
the subject of officer use of force.74 
 
https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/ny-metro-jail-Monitors-20181213-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/CR78-EXSE]. 
 68. See Jim Wagstaffe, Enforcing Settlement and Consent Decrees, LEXISNEXIS (Sept. 
12, 2018), 
https://www.lexisnexis.com/lexis-practice-advisor/the-journal/b/lpa/posts/enforcing-settl
ements-and-consent-decrees [https://perma.cc/TU8M-8TVR]; Monitors Standards, AM. 
BAR ASS’N, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/MonitorsStandards/ 
[https://perma.cc/H6BK-CP3U] (last visited Sept. 17, 2020). 
 69. See Loretta A. Johnson, Note, Protecting the Constitutional Rights of Minority 
Youth on Rikers Island, 6 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 48, 60 (2016). 
 70. 343 F.3d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 2003). The plaintiffs, represented by the Legal Aid Society, 
sued the City of New York and New York City jail officials in seven related class action 
lawsuits alleging unconstitutional confinement conditions. 
 71. See id. at 52. 
 72. 446 F.3d 335 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Handberry v. Thompson, 2016 WL 1268265 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016). This agreement ensures individuals have access to educational 
opportunities during their incarceration. See Derek Gilna, Court Issues New Injunction 
Mandating Education for NYC Prisoners at Rikers Island, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (July 6, 
2016), 
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2016/jul/6/court-issues-new-injunction-mandating
-education-nyc-prisoners-rikers-island/ [https://perma.cc/XD5T-WKGT]. 
 73. This Monitor was established under Brad H. v. City of New York, a class action 
brought in 1999 by the Urban Justice Center. See Impact Litigation, URB. JUST. CTR. 
(Nov. 25, 2019), https://mhp.urbanjustice.org/2019/11/25/brad-h-v-city-of-new-york/ 
[https://perma.cc/CM7W-SGSS]. 
 74. See Nunez Complaint, supra note 11. 
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C. Nunez v. City of New York and the Nunez Federal Monitorship 
In 2012, after decades of bringing litigation against the City for 
correction officers’ perpetrated brutality,75 the Prisoners’ Rights Project 
at the Legal Aid Society filed Nunez v. City of New York.76  The lawsuit 
alleged a “pattern and practice of unnecessary and excessive force 
inflicted upon inmates of New York City jails by [DOC] uniformed staff . 
. . knowingly permitted and encouraged by Department supervisors,” 
citing 11 incidents where DOC staff beat and abused incarcerated people 
(the plaintiffs) as examples.77  The parties signed a Consent Judgment in 
2015, which, in around 300 provisions, outlines how DOC is to train, 
report, investigate, and discipline use of force by correction officers.78  The 
Consent Judgment also focuses on the particular issue of incarcerating 
minors on Rikers Island.79  As stated in Section I.B, the decree also set up 
 
 75. See The Prisoners’ Rights Project, LEGAL AID SOC’Y, 
https://www.legalaidnyc.org/programs-projects-units/the-prisoners-rights-project/ 
[https://perma.cc/EE5K-7FGQ] (last visited Sept. 16, 2020) (“[T]he Prisoners’ Rights 
Project [(PRP)] has been fighting to end the rampant brutality by staff against people 
incarcerated in New York City jails and mandate reforms to prevent abuse. Our successive 
class action litigations challenging staff brutality in individual jails lead to the landmark 
decision in Sheppard v. Phoenix, ended the reign of terror in New York City’s Central 
Punitive Segregation Unit. When the City failed in its obligations, PRP brought system 
wide class action litigation in Ingles v. Toro, which revised the use of force policy and 
piloted camera surveillance in the jails.”); see also Boston, supra note 4, at 161–68. 
 76. Nunez Complaint, supra note 11. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See generally Nunez v. City of New York, 11 Civ. 5845 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2015) 
(consent judgment) [hereinafter Nunez Consent Judgment]. For example, under this 
agreement, DOC was required to implement a new Use of Force Directive, or policy, which 
is written according to the general principles that 
(i) the force used shall always be the minimum amount necessary, and must be 
proportional to the resistance or threat encountered; (ii) the use of excessive and 
unnecessary force is expressly prohibited; (iii) the Department has a zero 
tolerance policy for excessive and unnecessary force; and (iv) the best and safest 
way to manage potential Use of Force situations is to prevent or resolve them 
without physical force. 
Id. at 5. The consent decree also ensured mandatory training and reporting requirements 
for staff, investigation procedure, staff discipline, special provisions for the supervision of 
people under the age of 19, discipline of incarcerated people, and the creation and 
implementation of a plan to move all people in custody under the age of 18 off Rikers 
Island. See id. at 10, 15, 25, 40, 44, 46. 
 79. See Ninth Report of the Nunez Independent Monitor at 1–2, Nunez, 11 Civ. 5845 
(S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2020) [hereinafter Ninth Nunez Monitor’s Report], 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doc/downloads/pdf/9thMonitorsReport052920AsFiled.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6D83-2RSL]. In 2018, Governor Andrew Cuomo signed the Raise the 
Age Law, which required New York City and DOC to move 16- and 17-year-olds off of 
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an independent Monitor, the Nunez Monitor, that tracks DOC’s 
compliance with the Consent Judgement and has published detailed 
reports approximately every six months for the past five years.80  By May 
2020, the Monitor had issued nine reports.81 
Today, there are record-low numbers of incarcerated people in the City 
jails.82  Furthermore, DOC’s staff-to-inmate ratio is 1:1.3, making it the 
“largest staffing complement for jails in the United States.”83  This 
 
Rikers Island and into facilities the DOC and the Administration of Children’s Services 
jointly managed. See Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor Cuomo 
Announces Raise the Age Law Now in Effect [hereinafter Raise the Age Law], 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-raise-age-law-now-effect 
[https://perma.cc/725D-HDK3] (last visited Sept. 17, 2020). 
 80. See Nunez Monitor Reports, N.Y.C. DEP’T CORRECTION, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doc/media/nunez-reports.page 
[https://perma.cc/9WAH-J2UH] (last visited Sept. 18, 2020); see also Benjamin Weiser, 
Lawsuit Accuses City’s Jails of Condoning Inmate Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/30/nyregion/suit-says-new-york-citys-jails-condone-g
uards-beatings-of-inmates.html [https://perma.cc/E6UT-8GUD]; Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Just., U.S. Att’y’s Off. for the S. Dist. of N.Y, Department of Justice Takes Legal 
Action to Address Pattern and Practice of Excessive Force and Violence at Rikers Island 
Jails That Violates the Constitutional Rights of Young Male Inmates (Dec. 18, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/department-justice-takes-legal-action-address-pat
tern-and-practice-excessive-force-and [https://perma.cc/GK2Q-UKUC]. 
 81. This Note focuses on the Eighth and Ninth Monitor Reports, dated October 28, 
2019, and May 29, 2020, respectively. As of the time of this Note’s publication, it is likely 
that another report will have been issued. Although some facts on the ground will change, 
it is the Author’s opinion that DOC’s non-compliance with the Nunez Consent Judgment 
will not be radically different. 
 82. At the end of the reporting period in Fiscal 2020, the average daily jail population 
in New York City was approximately just over 7,000. See Cynthia Brann, What We Do, 
N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CORR., PRELIMINARY MAYOR’S MGMT. REP. 61, 61 (2020) [hereinafter 
PRELIMINARY MAYOR’S MGMT. REP.], 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/pdf/pmmr2020/doc.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q7ZS-HJ2Z]; see also Average Daily Jail Population in NYC, MAYOR’S 
OFF. CRIM. JUST., 
https://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/individual_charts/average-daily-jail-population
-in-nyc/ [https://perma.cc/7WMV-U2XH] (last visited Aug. 21, 2020) (showing a steady 
decrease in jail population since 1991). By May 2020, the jail population decreased to 
under 4,000 people, the lowest levels of people in DOC custody since 1946. See Ninth Nunez 
Monitor’s Report, supra note 79, at 2. The decrease since 2019 is mostly due is mostly due 
to the global COVID-19 pandemic. See id. at 11. 
 83. Eighth Report of the Nunez Independent Monitor at 7, Nunez, 11 Civ. 5845 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2019) [hereinafter Eighth Nunez Monitor’s Report], 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doc/downloads/pdf/8th_Monitor_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3REX-Y6RB]. Michael Jacobson, the Executive Director of the CUNY 
Institute for State and Local Governance and a member of the Independent Commission 
on New York City Justice and Incarceration Reform, has observed that DOC staffing has 
stayed the same since the 1990s, even though the jail population has dropped by 
approximately three-quarters. See Ethan Geringer-Sameth, Council to Examine Persistent 
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staffing ratio and level of physical control should enable DOC to reduce 
the use of violence on incarcerated people; however, the Ninth Nunez 
Monitor’s Report, published in May 2020, reveals that DOC officers have 
carried out the highest levels of use of force incidents since 2015.84  The 
Report also announced that “the conditions that gave rise to the Consent 
Judgment have not abated . . . and the desired outcomes are simply not 
yet evident.”85  The parties filed with the court in August 2020 and signed 
a Remedial Order86 in response to continued non-compliance with the 
original Consent Judgment.87 
II. MAPPING THE NEW YORK CITY JAIL SYSTEM 
The Nunez Monitor is federally appointed oversight that has 
continuously reported DOC’s inability to control officer use of force levels.  
However, jails in New York City already have internal mechanisms and 
external oversight that should, in theory, be able to tackle the pervasive 
correction officer use of force.  Before analyzing the shortcomings of these 
internal investigations and external oversight bodies, Section II.A 
examines the structure of DOC itself, including the internal systems the 
 
and Growing Violence Plaguing City Jails, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Jan. 28, 2020), 
https://www.gothamgazette.com/city/9069-council-to-examine-growing-violence-plaguin
g-city-jails-rikers [https://perma.cc/3P85-9YQR]; Our Mission, A MORE JUST NYC, 
https://www.morejustnyc.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/W6Z6-BFK2] (last visited Aug. 
17, 2020). He stated, “it’s probably the most richly-resourced correctional system on the 
planet.” See Geringer-Sameth, supra note 83. 
 84. See Ninth Nunez Monitor’s Report, supra note 79, at 3 (explaining that “use of 
force rates . . . [have] reached their highest level since the Consent Judgment went into 
effect”); see also Eighth Nunez Monitor’s Report, supra note 83, at 3 (stating the exact 
same thing). 
 85. See Ninth Nunez Monitor’s Report, supra note 79, at 3 (stating “the conditions 
that gave rise to the Consent Judgment have not abated since the Effective Date, and the 
desired outcomes are simply not yet evident”). 
 86. See generally Remedial Consent Order Addressing Non-Compliance, Nunez, 11 Civ. 
5845 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 05, 2020) [hereinafter Nunez Remedial Consent Order], 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/press-release/file/1301816/download 
[https://perma.cc/VSJ9-K6PP]. 
 87. See Press Release, Legal Aid Soc’y, Statement on Agreement to Address City’s 
Ongoing Non-Compliance Issues with Rikers Island Consent Judgment (Aug. 6, 2020), 
https://legalaidnyc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/08-06-20-1-Statement-On-Agreemen
t-To-Address-City%E2%80%99s-Ongoing-Non-Compliance-Issues-with-Rikers-Island-C
onsent-Judgment.pdf [https://perma.cc/BX7E-83JC]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
U.S. Att’y’s Off. for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Acting Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces 
Agreement to Address New York City’s Ongoing Non-Compliance with Rikers Consent 
Judgment (Aug. 6, 2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/acting-manhattan-us-attorney-announces-agreem
ent-address-new-york-city-s-ongoing-non [https://perma.cc/RC47-KVAJ]. 
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Nunez Consent Judgment required DOC to implement.  Then Section II.B 
explores oversight actors within New York City.  Finally, Section II.C 
looks at oversight actors in New York State.  Sections II.B and II.C 
consider what kind of authority these oversight actors have to either 
require DOC to confront the issue of officer use of force or to impact this 
crisis on their own. 
A. The Department of Correction 
The New York City DOC dates back to 1895,88 and today controls 11 
jail buildings (eight of which are on Rikers Island), two hospital prison 
wards, and court holding pens in all five boroughs.89  As mandated by the 
New York City Charter, a Commissioner of Correction (the 
Commissioner), who has the authority to appoint two deputies,90 heads 
DOC.91  The Mayor appoints and has discretionary power to remove the 
Commissioner.92  The Commissioner has “charge and management” of the 
City’s jails, hospital wards, and court pens.93  As of 2020, DOC has a 
budget that supports a staff of 12,206: 10,063 are uniformed officers and 
2,043 are civilians who serve various administrative functions.94  Officers 
are collectively represented in a powerful union, the Correction Officers’ 
Benevolent Association (COBA).95  DOC’s budget, passed by the New 
 
 88. History of DOC, N.Y.C. DEP’T CORRECTION, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doc/about/history-doc.page [https://perma.cc/R4HX-L6L3] 
(last visited Aug. 17, 2020). 
 89. See Facilities Overview, N.Y.C. DEP’T CORRECTION, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doc/about/about-doc.page [https://perma.cc/HM56-YG7M] 
(last visited Aug. 17, 2020). 
 90. See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 622. 
 91. See id. § 621. 
 92. See id. § 6. 
 93. See id. § 623. 
 94. N.Y. CITY COUNCIL, FINANCE DIVISION BRIEFING PAPER: DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTION 2 (2019) [hereinafter FINANCE DIVISION BRIEFING PAPER], 
https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2019/03/072-DOC-2020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7M3Y-SFXP]. 
 95. The Correction Officers’ Benevolent Association (COBA), New York City’s 
correction officers’ union, is certified by the Office of Collective Bargaining (OCB). See 
Bargaining Units, OFF. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, 
https://www.ocb-nyc.org/guides/bargaining/ [https://perma.cc/8BGZ-XGTE] (last visited 
Sept. 16, 2020). The Board of Certification, one of two separate boards under OCB, 
“determines which union, if any, represents a majority of employees in a given unit and 
certifies that union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the bargaining 
unit.” Board of Certification, OFF. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, 
https://www.ocb-nyc.org/about/board-of-certification/ [https://perma.cc/P4P6-N9SL] 
(last visited Aug. 21, 2020). Representing around 9,000 DOC employees, COBA has an 
executive board and assigned delegates to each of the New York City jail facilities, 
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York City Council, is $1.4 billion for 2020.96  As the agency with direct 
control over the day-to-day operations of New York City jails, DOC — 
and by extension, the correction officers who work for it and its internal 
mechanisms that are in place for correction officers’ actions — is the focus 
of the Nunez Consent Judgment. 
DOC publishes directives, or “Policy and Operating Procedures,” “that 
[govern] the methods of accomplishing [the] missions, objectives, and 
goals” of the Department and details the “full scope” of DOC’s 
activities.97  DOC’s “Use of Force” directive was rewritten to conform 
with the Nunez Consent Judgment.98  DOC also promulgated Title 39 of 
the Rules of the City of New York, which contains the “Inmate Rule 
Book.”99  This rule book outlines the rights of incarcerated people, 
detailing general rights and privileges, required rules of conduct, hearing 
procedures, penalties, and appeals.100  Directives and the Inmate Rule 
Book contain what DOC has officially sanctioned as appropriate staff 
behavior and the rights of incarcerated people within City jail facilities. 
DOC has internal mechanisms to investigate instances when official 
procedures are not followed.  The Investigation Division (ID) investigates 
misconduct DOC staff commit, including use of force and sexual assault 
allegations.101  The ID has civilian and officer staffers,102 and its staff has 
grown to 245 employees in the past few years in an effort to comply with 
the Nunez Consent Decree.103  The Nunez Ninth Monitor’s report 
 
including prison hospital wards and the Investigations Unit within DOC. See About 
COBA, CORR. OFFICERS’ BENEVOLENT ASS’N, INC., 
https://www.cobanyc.org/correction-officers-benevolent-association-inc 
[https://perma.cc/BEX7-YD8X] (last visited Sept. 17, 2020). 
 96. See FINANCE DIVISION BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 94, at 1. 
 97. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CORR., DIRECTIVE NO. 0001: TABLE OF CONTENTS (1978). 
Different distribution rules apply to directives, 46 of which are approved for online 
publication. See Directives, N.Y.C. DEP’T CORRECTION, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doc/directives/directives.page [https://perma.cc/34G7-5FQ2] 
(last visited Sept. 17, 2020). 
 98. See Heidi Grossman, Deputy Comm’r of Legal Matters, N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., 
Statement before the New York City Council (Nov. 14, 2016), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doc/media/nunez-settlement%20.page 
[https://perma.cc/G772-XHJW]. 
 99. 39 R.C.N.Y §§ 1-01–1-06. 
 100. See id. § 1-02. 
 101. See Job Posting Notice for Investigator Position in Investigations Unit, N.Y.C. DEP’T 
CORRECTION (July 28, 2017), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/jointheboldest/downloads/pdf/job/DisciplineStaff_Conduct
_%20II_072_2018_296183.pdf [https://perma.cc/23CY-PZUX]. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See Ninth Nunez Monitor’s Report, supra note 79, at 171. 
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announced that DOC reorganized the units under ID, moving from a 
facility-based model to an “Intake Squad,” launched in February of 
2020,104 responsible for the preliminary evaluation of each use of force 
incident.105  The Intake Squad investigator decides whether to close the 
investigation and recommend a disciplinary or administrative response 
against the officer involved, or refer the investigation for a “Full ID” 
investigation.106  The DOC Deputy Commissioner who oversees the ID 
also oversees the Trials Division,107 which is required to “negotiate plea 
dispositions and make recommendations to [the Office of Administrative 
Trials and Hearings]108 judges” when the ID forwards a case of officer 
misconduct.109  How quickly and objectively ID staff is able to process 
incidents and decide what follow up is necessary is an indicator of how 
well DOC, as an agency, can regulate its own behavior; the review process 
of use of force incidents has continually not met the standards laid out by 
the Nunez Consent Judgment.110 
DOC must also operate in compliance with Minimum Standards BOC, 
the Department’s non-judicial oversight board, promulgates.111  
However, DOC can make an application to BOC to request a variance 
from these Minimum Standards.112  BOC then holds public meetings,113 
where it votes on DOC’s variance requests.114  A variance can be: (1) 
“limited,” to extend for a set period of time; (2) “continuing,” set for an 
indefinite amount of time; or (3) “emergency,” granted for a maximum of 
30 days.115  A continuing variance can only be requested if, “despite . . . 
 
 104. See id. at 48. 
 105. See id. at 43–44. 
 106. See id. at 45–46. For a description of a “Full ID” investigation, see Nunez Consent 
Judgment, supra note 78, at 18–21. 
 107. Leadership at DOC, N.Y.C. DEP’T CORRECTION, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doc/about/leadership-at-doc.page 
[https://perma.cc/A2UK-MQ5W] (last visited Aug. 19, 2020). 
 108. See infra Section II.B.iv. 
 109. Nunez Consent Judgment, supra note 78, at 27. 
 110. See infra Section III.A. 
 111. See infra Section II.B.i. 
 112. See 40 R.C.N.Y. § 1-15(a). 
 113. See Meetings, NYC BD. CORRECTION, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/boc/meetings/meetings.page [https://perma.cc/G5FE-78SH] 
(last visited Aug. 19, 2020). 
 114. See 40 R.C.N.Y. § 1-15(a); see also, e.g., Record of Variance Action for July 9, 2019 
Public Meeting, NYC BD. CORRECTION, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/boc/downloads/pdf/Meetings/2019/July/2019.7%20Record
%20of%20Variance%20Action%20-%20Psychotropic%20medications%20FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MQE3-2HKZ]. 
 115. 40 R.C.N.Y. § 1-15(b). 
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best efforts,” full compliance would “create extreme practical difficulties 
as a result of circumstances unique to a particular facility.”116  BOC can 
only grant an indefinite variance if it “would not create a danger or undue 
hardship to staff or prisoners,” or “an alternative” way of satisfying the 
“intent” of the minimum standard is available.117  Variance requests are 
a primary way that DOC and BOC formally interact, and require that the 
two agencies be in ongoing communication.  Although BOC has the power 
to investigate DOC practices, whether BOC denied a variance request or 
not,118 it is unclear whether BOC would have the power to sue to enforce 
the Minimum Standards.  Even though it is DOC’s staff that is on the 
ground carrying out the day-to-day operations in City jails, DOC, as an 
agency, sits in the middle of a web of oversight actors described in 
Sections II.B and II.C. 
B. New York City Government Oversight Agencies and Officials 
As Professors Michele Deitch and Michael Mushlin aptly put it, 
“independent, external oversight of conditions in correctional facilities is 
an essential tool for protecting human rights in a closed institutional 
environment” like New York City jails.119  As the Constitution of New 
York State cedes “home rule powers” to local governments within the 
state,120 the New York City Charter outlines much of the legal authority 
over New York City jails to specific actors within the New York City 
government.121  This Section examines the authority of the BOC, the 
Mayor and the Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice (MOCJ), the New York 
City Council and pertinent committees and commissions under its 
purview, the Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH), the 
Department of Investigation (DOI), and the Bronx District Attorney’s 
Office, as it pertains to DOC and DOC employees. 
i. Board of Correction 
The New York City BOC is a non-judicial oversight board that 
“regulates, monitors, and inspects the correctional facilities of the 
 
 116. Id. § 1-15(b)(2). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See infra Section II.B.i. 
 119. Deitch & Mushlin, supra note 9, at 248. 
 120. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2. 
 121. See generally N.Y.C. CHARTER. 
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City.”122  Twenty years after its creation in 1957, New York City voters 
approved Charter Amendments that gave the Board a mandate to create 
Minimum Standards, or “binding and enforceable regulations,”123 for the 
care of all people in DOC’s custody. 124  Nine people serve on the Board 
for six-year, staggered terms.125  To scale back the Mayor’s dominance, 
the 1977 Charter Amendments diversified who selects BOC members126 — 
now, the Mayor chooses three, the City Council chooses three, and the two 
departments of the New York State Appellate Court nominate the last 
three members.127  The BOC members have “for-cause” removal 
protection, meaning they can only be removed for neglect of their 
duties.128  In 2020, the Board’s budget was $3.1 million,129 which is only 
0.22% of the amount of money allocated to DOC. 
The BOC’s ability to publicize information is key to its oversight role.  
It has the authority to inspect or visit any facility under DOC’s 
jurisdiction at-will, read all agency records, and evaluate DOC’s 
performance.130  Importantly, the Board also has subpoena power,131 
entitling it to any piece of information or individual testimony by those 
in DOC.  In addition, the Board must submit a report to the Mayor, the 
New York City Council, and the DOC Commissioner at least once per year 
with “findings and recommendations” for the better administration of 
jails.132  The power to compel DOC employees to appear publicly at Board 
 
 122. About, NYC BD. CORRECTION, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/boc/about/about.page 
[https://perma.cc/9LDV-NB9K] (last visited Aug. 19, 2020). 
 123. Richard Wolf, Reflection on a Government Model of Correctional Oversight, 30 PACE 
L. REV. 1610, 1612–13 (2010). 
 124. See John Brickman, The Role of Civilian Organizations with Prison Access and 
Citizen Members: The New York Experience, 30 PACE L. REV. 1562, 1564–65 (2010). 
 125. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 626(a). 
 126. See Brickman, supra note 124, at 1566. 
 127. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 626(a). 
 128. See id. In addition to the nine members, the Board has a staff that includes teams 
under the Executive Director, General Counsel, Monitoring, and Research. See Board 
Staff, NYC BD. CORRECTION, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/boc/about/board-staff.page 
[https://perma.cc/R44P-4K9S] (last visited Aug. 19, 2020). This staff consists of fewer 
than 30 people who work either from an office in New York City’s main municipal building 
or in an office trailer on Rikers Island. See id. Compare this figure to DOC staff, which is 
approximately 12,000. See FINANCE DIVISION BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 94, at 7. 
 129. See N.Y. CITY COUNCIL, FINANCE DIVISION BRIEFING PAPER: BOARD OF 
CORRECTION 2 (2019), 
https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2019/03/073-BOC-2020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C92T-7CQZ]. 
 130. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 626(c). 
 131. See id. § 626(g). 
 132. Id. § 626(d). 
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meetings, and having the right to any DOC materials, enables BOC to 
direct public and press attention to the issues going on in New York City 
jails. 
As mentioned above, the City Charter charges the Board with 
establishing Minimum Standards for the “care, custody, correction, 
treatment, supervision, and discipline” for the people incarcerated in New 
York City jails, codified as Title 40 in the Rules of the City of New 
York.133  These Minimum Standards regulate a wide range of issues, from 
access to health and mental health care to the amount of time DOC can 
place an individual in punitive segregation or solitary confinement.134  
However, as Section III.B discusses, the Board has not promulgated 
Minimum Standards for officer use of force.135  If the Department cannot 
comply with something dictated in these Minimum Standards, DOC must 
make a variance request, which is heard and decided on at the Board’s 
public meetings, where activists, experts, and elected officials usually 
comment publicly.136  Again, these regular public meetings emphasize the 
Board’s ability to drive news coverage and put otherwise hidden issues in 
City jails on display. 
ii. Office of the Mayor 
As the chief executive officer of New York City,137 the Mayor can 
impact the City’s policy priorities mainly through staffing decisions and 
budget priorities.  The heads of mayoral agencies serve at the Mayor’s 
pleasure and he, therefore, has the power to hire and fire the 
Commissioner of Correction.138  The Mayor also has the authority to 
appoint Deputy Mayors with whatever “duties and responsibilities” he 
assigns.139  For example, the First Deputy Mayor “directly supervises and 
 
 133. See About, NYC BD. CORRECTION, supra note 122. The Mayor and DOC 
Commissioner have the opportunity to review and comment on Minimum Standards 
before the Board publishes them. See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 626(e). 
 134. See generally 40 R.C.N.Y. §§ 1-01–5-42. 
 135. See infra Section III.B. 
 136. See, e.g., 2019 Meetings, NYC BD. CORRECTION, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/boc/meetings/2019-meetings.page 
[https://perma.cc/AB3L-5Q4Q] (last visited Aug.19, 2020). The live recordings, agendas, 
and decisions made in these meetings are posted on the Board’s website. See id. 
 137. See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 3. 
 138. See id. § 6. 
 139. Id. § 7. 
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coordinates with the Department of Correction.”140  The Mayor can also 
reorganize any agencies under his purview,141 which include the MOCJ,142 
the Mayor’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Mayor’s 
Office of Labor Relations (OLR).  Each of these three offices plays a 
different role in the operation, direction, and workforce of New York City 
jails. 
The MOCJ has the duty to advise the Mayor regarding any “criminal 
justice programs and activities” within New York City.143  Within the 
MOCJ, the Justice Implementation Task Force is dedicated to the 
“Smaller, Safer, Fairer” plan to close Rikers Island and build four 
borough-based jails facilities with a maximum capacity of 3,300 total.144  
The Justice Implementation Task Force has three working groups: Safely 
Reducing the Size of the Jail Population, Culture Change, and Design and 
Facilities.145  OMB assists the Mayor with his duty to propose a 
preliminary and executive budget.146  As dictated by the Charter, the 
Mayor plays a significant role in creating the City’s operating budget, 
coordinating the reported needs of every government agency in the 
City,147  and negotiating with the New York City Council to pass a budget 
each year.148  OLR represents the Mayor “in the conduct of all labor 
relations between the City of New York and labor unions representing 
employees of the City.”149  Therefore, through collective bargaining 
 
 140. First Deputy Mayor, OFF. MAYOR, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/dean-fuleihan.page 
[https://perma.cc/HE89-QVHK] (last visited Aug. 19, 2020). 
 141. See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 11. 
 142. Id. § 13. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See The Justice Implementation Task Force, MAYOR’S OFF. CRIM. JUST., 
https://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/programs/justice-implementation-task-force/ 
[https://perma.cc/6CAK-L5BU] (last visited Aug. 19, 2020). 
 145. See SMALLER SAFER FAIRER: A ROADMAP TO CLOSING RIKERS ISLAND, supra note 
43, at 8–9. 
 146. See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 225(a)–(b). The New York City budget schedule is laid out 
in the New York City Charter. See New York City Budget Cycle, MAYOR’S OFF. MGMT. & 
BUDGET, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/omb/about/new-york-city-budget-cycle.page 
[https://perma.cc/ARP2-VF8Z] (last visited Aug. 19, 2020). 
 147. See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 103. 
 148. See id. § 254. The Mayor has veto power over changes to the budget, but this can 
be overridden by a two-thirds vote in the Council. See id. § 255. New York City Council’s 
Committee on Finance is tasked with reviewing and modifying the City’s budget. See 
Committee on Finance, N.Y. CITY COUNCIL, https://council.nyc.gov/committees/finance/ 
[https://perma.cc/9E47-E86X] (last visited Aug. 19, 2020). 
 149. About OLR, OFF. LAB. RELS., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/olr/about/about-olr.page 
[https://perma.cc/EHW9-MPWF] (last visited Aug. 19, 2020). The Executive Orders 
dictate the Mayor’s legal authority. See id. 
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agreements, COBA, the union that represents thousands of DOC 
employees, contracts with OLR.150  It is the Mayor who dictates the 
administration’s priorities when coordinating with mayoral agencies like 
DOC, when proposing and negotiating the content the City’s operating 
budget, and when bargaining with city employees. 
iii. New York City Council 
The New York City Council (the Council) is the “legislative body of the 
city”151 and operates as an “equal partner” to the Mayor.152  The legal 
relationship between the Mayor and the Council is comparable to that of 
the President and Congress on the federal level.153  The Council is 
composed of 51 Council Members, each elected from a district in New 
York City.154  The Council also has a popularly elected public advocate,155 
who does not get a vote but acts as an ombudsman for the City 
government.156  The Council currently includes 38 standing committees 
that have jurisdiction over different matters and city agencies.157  For 
example, the Committee on Criminal Justice oversees DOC, BOC, and the 
 
 150. See, e.g., Executed Contract: Correction Officers, OFF. OF LAB. RELS. (Jan. 6, 2017) 
[hereinafter COBA Agreement], 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/olr/downloads/pdf/collectivebargaining/coba-final-agreeme
nt-2011-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/TM75-EZ2K]. The last contract expired on February 
28, 2019, and negotiations are still pending. See President’s Message, COBA NEWS, Apr. 
2019, at 3, 
https://www.cobanyc.org/sites/default/files/files/COBA_Newsletter_April_2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X3U9-BXAU]. In addition to outlining requirements for salary, 
vacation, and health benefits, this expired contract also ensures the existence of a labor 
management committee to interface with OLR. See COBA Agreement, supra note 150, at 
35. It also created the Rikers Island Central Arrest Unit in coordination with the Bronx 
District Attorney to “pursue re-arrest of aggravated harassment and assault on Correction 
Officers committed by [incarcerated persons] while [in jail].” Id. at 64. 
 151. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 21. The Council has the power to amend the New York City 
Charter. See id. § 40. 
 152. What We Do, N.Y. CITY COUNCIL, https://council.nyc.gov/azbout/ 
[https://perma.cc/HA5M-ZP24] (last visited Aug. 19, 2020). 
 153. See id. 
 154. See Council Members & Districts, N.Y. CITY COUNCIL, 
https://council.nyc.gov/districts/ [https://perma.cc/EX5L-F7LV] (last visited Aug. 19, 
2020). 
 155. See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 24. The Council also elects a speaker who presides over 
Council meetings. See id. § 44. 
 156. See Duties of the Public Advocate Office, N.Y.C. PUB. ADVOC. JUMAANE D. 
WILLIAMS, https://www.pubadvocate.nyc.gov/about#duties/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z9L3-3NAJ] (last visited Sept. 17, 2020) (“In the event of a vacancy or 
incapacity of the mayor, the public advocate is first in line to become mayor.”). 
 157. See Committees, N.Y. CITY COUNCIL, https://council.nyc.gov/committees/ 
[https://perma.cc/X8BM-UCZA] (last visited Aug 24, 2020). 
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Department of Probation.158  As DOC falls within its purview, the 
Committee on Criminal Justice has the power of “investigation and 
oversight” and must review DOC’s activities, efficiency, and appropriated 
budget.159  Furthermore, the Committee is responsible for holding at least 
one hearing per year on the Department’s activities.160  As with every 
committee in the Council, this committee can demand any government-
employed person to appear under oath and compel the production of any 
document it deems necessary.161 
The former Speaker of the City Council, Melissa Mark-Viverito, 
convened the Independent Commission on New York City Criminal 
Justice and Incarceration Reform, which issued a blueprint, A More Just 
New York City, for improving New York City’s criminal justice system in 
2017.162  This proposal called for closing Rikers Island and building new, 
borough-based facilities, on top of other reforms.163  As outlined above, 
the de Blasio Administration then issued its plan for closing Rikers and 
convened the Justice Implementation Task Force under the MOCJ.164  In 
October 2019, the Council officially voted to close Rikers Island165 and 
passed Local Law 2019/192, which requires the MOCJ to submit a report 
twice per year and BOC to submit a report once per year on the status of 
closing Rikers Island.166 
 
 158. See Committee on Criminal Justice, N.Y. CITY COUNCIL, 
https://council.nyc.gov/committees/criminal-justice/ [https://perma.cc/QE2Z-F2J6] (last 
visited Aug 24, 2020). 
 159. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 29(a)(1)–(2) (this section also gives each individual City Council 
member power of investigation and oversight, and, therefore, any Council member can 
visit City jails at any time); see, e.g., Samar Khursid, Now Overseeing Closure, Council 
Member Makes First Visit to Rikers, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Mar. 7, 2018), 
https://www.gothamgazette.com/city/7516-now-overseeing-rikers-closure-council-membe
r-makes-first-visit [https://perma.cc/4AG7-WTYK]. 
 160. See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 29(a)(1)–(2) 
 161. See id. § 29(b). 
 162. INDEP. COMM’N ON N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. & INCARCERATION REFORM, A MORE JUST 
NEW YORK CITY 14 (2017) [hereinafter A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY], 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b6de4731aef1de914f43628/t/5b96c6f81ae6cf5e9c5
f186d/1536607993842/Lippman+Commission+Report+FINAL+Singles.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6XBW-CYVX]. 
 163. See FINANCE DIVISION BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 94, at 12–14. 
 164. See supra Section II.B.ii. 
 165. See Richard Gonzalez, City Council Votes to Close New York’s Notorious Rikers 
Island Jail Complex, NPR (Oct. 17, 2019, 8:32 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/10/17/771167909/new-york-to-close-citys-notorious-rikers-isla
nd-jail-complex [https://perma.cc/YH57-REVX]; see also SMALLER SAFER FAIRER: A 
ROADMAP TO CLOSING RIKERS ISLAND, supra note 43. 
 166. N.Y. CITY COUNCIL, LEGIS. RSCH. CTR., 
https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=4146410&GUID=8E3F4ED
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iv. Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings 
If DOC seeks to take disciplinary action against one of their employees, 
that employee has a right to a hearing in front of an administrative law 
judge (ALJ) in the Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings 
(OATH).167  This is because both uniformed and non-uniformed DOC 
employees take an exam as part of the application process,168 and are 
therefore designated as “competitive class” employees under the New 
York State Civil Service Law.169  OATH’s mandate is to “conduct 
adjudicatory hearings for all agencies of the city unless otherwise 
provided for by executive order, rule, law or pursuant to collective 
bargaining agreements.”170  OATH has also promulgated rules governing 
these disciplinary hearings171 that give ALJs particular privileges.  For 
example, ALJs have the right to request that the “personnel file, abstract 
of a personnel file, driver record, owner record, or other similar or 
analogous file” be provided for his or her review if not previously entered 
into evidence.172  However, the DOC Commissioner ultimately still retains 
the “authority to accept the factual findings and penalty 
recommendation or to modify them, as appropriate” after an OATH 
hearing.173 
 
3-8A6F-402F-9D5B-25A3707DA104&Options=&Search= 
[https://perma.cc/8E3E-JJMQ]. 
 167. See N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 75(1) (McKinney 2020). 
 168. See Become a Correction Officer, DEP’T CORRECTION, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/jointheboldest/officer/apply-now.page 
[https://perma.cc/8HKW-22UV] (last visited Sept. 17, 2020); Join the Boldest: All Open 
Jobs, DEP’T CORRECTION, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/jointheboldest/civilian/open-roles.page 
[https://perma.cc/72GC-7SXF] (last visited Aug. 17, 2020). 
 169. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 44 (McKinney 2020). 
 170. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1048(1). 
 171. See 48 R.C.N.Y. § 1-03. 
 172. Id. § 1-47(b). COBA’s collective bargaining agreement states that “the past 
disciplinary or work record of an employee may not be revealed during a Section 75 . . . 
disciplinary proceeding until a determination as to guilt or innocence of the member has 
been determined.” COBA Agreement, supra note 150. However, Title 48, § 1-47(b) specifies 
that an ALJ may request such records “upon determining that the petition” or document 
requesting the administrative hearing, “will be sustained in whole or in part.” 48 R.C.N.Y. 
§ 1-47(b). ALJs also maintain the right to obtain these records ex parte. See id. § 1-47(b). 
 173. Eighth Nunez Monitor’s Report, supra note 83, at 184. 
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v. Department of Investigation 
The DOI is New York City’s independent inspector general and is a law 
enforcement agency.174  Originally created in 1873 to root out corruption 
in City government,175 DOI’s authority is broad.  The Charter empowers 
the agency’s commissioner to “make any study or investigation which in 
his opinion may be in the best interests of the city, including but not 
limited to investigations of the affairs, functions, accounts, methods, 
personnel or efficiency of any agency.”176  DOI, therefore, has an 
incredible amount of discretion to look into an agency’s affairs that is 
widely recognized as having internal challenges, such as DOC. 
DOI has broad investigative and enforcement authority.  First, DOI 
has Inspectors General Units at all New York City agencies called squads, 
that investigate and can choose to coordinate prosecution of City 
personnel for illegal behavior.177  Squad 1 is specifically charged with 
conducting “system-wide” investigations and making recommendations 
to improve DOC, with a goal of “improving conditions in city jails.”178  
DOI is authorized to take into consideration any civil litigation brought 
against individual DOC officers, DOC, or the City, notices of claim 
received by or settled by the City’s comptroller about DOC, and any 
criminal charges brought against individual officers.179  Second, DOI has 
the duty to have a complaint bureau within DOC to receive complaints.180  
Third, the DOC Commissioner must act in coordination with the specific 
Inspector General assigned to DOC, who may bring formal and informal 
disciplinary proceedings against any DOC employee.181  Finally, DOI can 
 
 174. DOI’s Mission and History, DEP’T INVESTIGATION, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doi/about/mission.page [https://perma.cc/F7ZB-L8NH] (last 
visited Aug. 17, 2020). 
 175. See id. 
 176. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 803(b) (emphasis added). 
 177. Inspectors General, DEP’T INVESTIGATION, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doi/offices/inspector-general.page 
[https://perma.cc/GXG9-CERD] (last visited Aug. 17, 2020). 
 178. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 803(d)(1). The sub-section of DOI, or “squad,” responsible for 
Monitoring DOC is Squad 1. See Squad One, DEP’T INVESTIGATION, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doi/offices/squad-one.page [https://perma.cc/9JFH-ZJCB] 
(last visited Aug. 17, 2020). 
 179. See N.Y.C. CHARTER § 803(d)(1). 
 180. See id. § 804. 
 181. See Legal and Executive Authority: Executive Order No. 105, DEP’T INVESTIGATION, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doi/about/legal-executive-authority.page#eo105 
[https://perma.cc/L4ES-KGYM] (last visited Sept. 17, 2020). 
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also refer cases against DOC employees to the appropriate District 
Attorney for criminal prosecution.182 
vi. Bronx District Attorney’s Office 
The Bronx District Attorney (Bronx DA) has a trailer office on Rikers 
Island, which, as of 2018, housed 12 prosecutors and two investigators.183  
Two bureaus within the investigations division of the Bronx DA’s office 
are charged with handling subject matters that stem from crime within 
the jail system.184  First, the Rikers Island Prosecution Bureau targets 
“criminal networks” within City jails and “prosecutes criminal offenses 
committed on Rikers.”185  As part of this bureau, the Rikers Island 
Central Arrest unit was created by the City’s contract with COBA.186  
According to a memorandum of understanding between COBA and the 
City, the Arrest Unit pursues the “re-arrest for aggravated harassment 
and assault on Correction Officers committed by [incarcerated persons] 
while [in jail].”187  Second, the Public Integrity Unit is “responsible for 
examining allegations of misconduct by correction officers,”188 and 
specifically, “investigates allegations of excessive force by uniformed 
public servants.”189  There is also a Correction Intelligence Bureau, which 
has the general task of “[investigating] crime in the jails.”190  By setting 
 
 182. See Eighth Nunez Monitor’s Report, supra note 83, at 160 (“The Department shall 
promptly refer any Use of Force Incident to DOI for further investigation when the 
conduct of Staff appears to be criminal in nature.”). 
 183. See James C. McKinley Jr., Seeking to Curb Jail Violence, Bronx Prosecutors Set up 
Shop on Rikers Island, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/nyregion/rikers-bronx-prosecutor-violence.html 
[https://perma.cc/A2SS-T5NP]. 
 184. See Investigations Division, OFF. BRONX DIST. ATT’Y, 
https://www.bronxda.nyc.gov/html/bureaus/investigations-division.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/6VWF-EZNY] (last visited Sept. 17, 2020) (stating the Public Integrity 
Bureau and Rikers Island Prosecution Bureau handle crime originating in City jails). 
 185. Id. 
 186. See Press Release, Off. of the Mayor, Mayor de Blasio Announces Tentative 
Contract Agreement with Correction Officers’ Benevolent Association (Dec. 31, 2015), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/985-15/mayor-de-blasio-tentative-contr
act-agreement-correction-officers-benevolent [https://perma.cc/SEU9-TM88]. 
 187. COBA Agreement, supra note 150; see also Michael Schwirtz, New York City and 
Correction Officers Reach Tentative Contract Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/01/nyregion/new-york-city-correction-officers-reach-t
entative-contract-deal.html [https://perma.cc/5M83-MFGU] (finding this new contract 
provision allows the Central Arrest Unit to prosecute inmates more efficiently when they 
assault correction officers). 
 188. McKinley, supra note 183. 
 189. Investigations Division, supra note 184. 
 190. McKinley, supra note 183. 
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up an office directly on Rikers Island, this branch of the Bronx DA has a 
unique closeness to the day-to-day happening of City jails. 
C. New York State Oversight 
Both the governor’s agenda and New York State Legislature’s laws 
undoubtedly have an effect on criminal justice in New York City.191  
Committees within the New York State Senate and Assembly also focus 
on issues affecting incarcerated people.  Further, the Corrections 
Association of New York (CANY), which is one of only two independent 
organizations with authority to visit and report on State prisons,192 has 
existed since 1844, playing an important role in the history of advocating 
for prisoners’ rights in all of New York State.193  This Section, however, 
only examines the New York State Commission of Correction, as it is an 
oversight body that explicitly has authority over all of the jails and 
prisons in New York State. 
i. The State Commission of Correction 
The State’s legislative branch194 created the New York State’s 
Commission of Correction (SCOC or the Commission), which sits within 
the State’s executive branch.195  The Commission has three “deliberative” 
 
 191. See Raise the Age Law, supra note 79. 
 192. See Jack Beck, Role of the Correctional Association of New York in a New Paradigm 
of Prison Monitoring, 30 PACE L. REV. 1572, 1573 (2010); see also Who We Are, CORR. 
ASS’N N.Y., https://www.correctionalassociation.org/about-cany 
[https://perma.cc/WR7H-JAVN] (last visited Aug. 20, 2020). 
 193. See History and Impact, CORR. ASS’N N.Y., 
https://www.correctionalassociation.org/history-and-impact 
[https://perma.cc/C28J-RXDS] (last visited Aug. 17, 2020). 
 194. The New York State Legislature consists of a senate and an assembly. N.Y. CONST. 
art. III, § 1. The senate has a standing committee on Crime Victims, Crime, and Correction 
that issues reports and holds public meetings. See Crime Victims, Crime and Correction, 
N.Y. STATE SENATE, 
https://www.nysenate.gov/committees/crime-victims-crime-and-correction 
[https://perma.cc/85P9-7AN5] (last visited Sept. 17, 2020). The Assembly’s Standing 
Committee on Correction can hold hearings and issue reports on jails and prisons in the 
state. See Standing Committee on Correction, N.Y. STATE ASSEMBLY, 
https://nyassembly.gov/comm/?id=10 [https://perma.cc/EQ6W-GLYK] (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2020). Given the lack of public material produced by these standing committees 
with respect to New York City jails, however, this Note will not address them beyond this 
footnote. 
 195. See N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 4 (“Except as otherwise provided in this constitution, 
the heads of all other departments and the members of all boards and commissions, 
excepting temporary commissions for special purposes, shall be appointed by the 
governor.”). 
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members196 appointed by the Governor and confirmed with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, with each member serving five-year terms.197  
The Governor chooses one of these members to be the chairman, or chief 
executive officer. 198  The two other deliberative members serve as the 
chairs of the Medical Review Board and Citizens’ Policy and Complaint 
Review Council.199  The Medical Review Board makes recommendations 
for “improving the delivery of health care to detainees and sentenced 
offenders.”200  This duty exists because SCOC has the duty to “investigate 
and review the cause and circumstances surrounding the death of any 
inmate of a correctional facility.”201 
SCOC writes “reports [for] the Governor . . . of New York,”202 as the 
Commission is charged with “establishing minimum standards for the safe 
and proper operation of local jails and the inspection and enforcement of 
local facilities to ensure that facilities are meeting all legal 
requirements.”203  SCOC can approve or reject construction plans for 
correctional facilities.204  Further, SCOC has the power to contract,205 
issue subpoenas,206 and “[c]lose any correctional facility which is unsafe, 
unsanitary or inadequate.”207  This makes the scope of SCOC’s authority 
to affect the on-the-ground realities in New York State jails quite broad. 
 
 196. Medical Review Board and Citizen’s Policy and Complaint Review Council, N.Y. 
STATE, COMM’N CORRECTION [hereinafter Medical Review Board], 
https://scoc.ny.gov/mrbcpcrc.htm [https://perma.cc/2Z3A-CMQK] (last visited Aug. 17, 
2020). 
 197. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 41(1)–(2) (McKinney 2020). 
 198. See id. §§ 41(1), 44(1). 
 199. See Medical Review Board, supra note 196. 
 200. Id. 
 201. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 47. 
 202. N.Y. STATE, COMM’N OF CORR., THE WORST OFFENDERS, REPORT: THE MOST 
PROBLEMATIC CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES IN NEW YORK STATE 1–2 (2018) [hereinafter 
THE WORST OFFENDERS], 
https://scoc.ny.gov/pdfdocs/Problematic-Jails-Report-2-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2KTN-Z2ZH]. 
 203. Id. at 1. As of January 2020, there is a bill pending in the New York State 
Legislature which would require SCOC to present these reports to both the Assembly and 
the Senate, as well as to the Governor. See N.Y. Assemb. 9062, 243rd Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 
2019). 
 204. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 45(10). 
 205. See id. § 45(14). 
 206. Id. § 46(2). 
 207. Id. § 45(8)(a). 
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III. OVERSIGHT’S ABDICATION OF RESPONSIBILITY 
Part II outlined the systems within DOC and the non-DOC oversight 
actors responsible for setting the standards for how incarcerated people 
are treated and can potentially hold DOC accountable.  Part III catalogs 
DOC’s and oversight actors’ responses to the statistics of violence within 
jails, with the aim to ultimately show that at every stage, DOC and its 
oversight have failed to meaningfully address “unnecessary and 
excessive”208 officer use of force.  Instead, DOC prefers to focus on future 
goals and vague promises of a better system tomorrow.  Part III argues 
that New York City’s carceral system has met the crisis of violence in its 
jails with relative silence. 
A. “The System Is Overwhelmed”209 
DOC’s own data demonstrates a steady increase in use of force by 
correction officers in recent years.210  As stated above, the “use of force 
rates . . . reached their highest levels” since 2015, the year the Nunez 
Consent Judgment went into effect to address this exact issue.211  The 
Monitor has stated DOC’s failure to bring staff to comply with the consent 
decree is “driven in large part by the overreliance on Probe Teams,”212 
and alarms the use of unnecessarily painful escort techniques, 
unnecessary and improper use of [Chemical Agent or “OC”] spray,213 and 
hyper-confrontational staff behaviors.214  The Monitor also notes that 
these “problems are compounded by uniform leadership’s inability to 
identify these aspects of Staff misconduct, thus failing to address them 
with their subordinates.”215  Another major hurdle regarding staff 
 
 208. Ninth Nunez Monitor’s Report, supra note 79, at 3. 
 209. Eighth Nunez Monitor’s Report, supra note 83, at 5. 
 210. See PRELIMINARY MAYOR’S MGMT. REP., supra note 82, at 62; see also Erin Durkin, 
New Stats Show Surge in Violence at Rikers Island, POLITICO (Sept. 17, 2019, 6:51 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2019/09/17/new-stats-show-surge
-in-violence-at-rikers-island-1193798#:~:text=Advertisement- [https://perma.cc/REL8-
5GNB]. 
 211. See Ninth Nunez Monitor’s Report, supra note 79, at 3. 
 212. Probe teams are when a “large numbers of Staff respond to a centralized location 
(generally in or near intake) to suit up in heavy riot gear (helmet, prison vest, baton, 
poly-carbon shield, MK-9, chemical agent and breathing apparatus).” Id. at 28. 
“Although by policy, a Probe Team should consist of four to seven Officers and a Captain, 
often significantly larger numbers of Staff (up to 30) respond.” Id. 
 213. When someone is exposed to OC spray, that person must go through 
decontamination. See id. at 109 n.115. 
 214. See id. at 3. 
 215. Id. at 3–4. 
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discipline is the significant backlog of use of force incidents that require 
investigation.216  The Monitor continues to report that ID is 
“overwhelmed.”217  For example, between January 2019 and July 2019, 
approximately 2,000 instances of officer use of force against incarcerated 
individuals — many of which timed out of the administrative disciplinary 
hearing 18-month statute of limitations — went uninvestigated.218  
Further, by April 2020, a total of 8,400 preliminary and full investigations 
of use of force incidents remained pending.219 
In 2016, DOC issued a 14-point plan — an “Anti-Violence Reform 
Agenda.”220  Further, DOC’s internal policy, or directive, regarding use of 
force — that complies with the requirements of the Nunez Consent 
Judgment — went into effect in January of 2017.221  Despite its 
staff-to-inmate ratio of 1:1.3,222 in 2019, DOC embraced the reasoning 
that “as the . . . overall [incarcerated] population [in jail declines], [it] is 
managing a population made up of individuals with more serious 
offenses.”223  Most recently, in an appearance before the BOC at its 
January 2020 public meeting, DOC Commissioner Cynthia Brann and 
General Counsel Heidi Grossman responded to the troubling fact of 
ever-increasing rates of officer use of force, emphasizing that the 
Department was making progress and in partial or substantial compliance 
with 85% of the provisions outlined in the Nunez consent judgment.224  
However, as the Ninth Nunez Monitor report observes, DOC remains 
non-compliant “with four of the most consequential provisions of the 
Consent Judgment: (1) implementation of the Use of Force Policy . . . ; 
 
 216. See id. at 174. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See Eighth Nunez Monitor’s Report, supra note 83, at 131–32 (“Pursuant to [New 
York] Civil Service Law . . . § 75 . . . ‘no removal or disciplinary proceeding shall be 
commenced more than eighteen months after the occurrence of the alleged incompetency 
or misconduct complained of and described in the charges . . . such limitations shall not 
apply where the incompetency or misconduct complained of and described in the charges 
would, if proved in a court of appropriate jurisdiction, constitute a crime.’”). 
 219. See Ninth Nunez Monitor’s Report, supra note 79, at 41. 
 220. See DOC’s 14-Point Antiviolence Reform Agenda, DEP’T CORRECTION, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doc/downloads/press-release/2016_Com_%20PontePresenta
tion.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZB2P-LDA8] (last visited Aug. 23, 2020). 
 221. See supra Section II.A. 
 222. Eighth Nunez Monitor’s Report, supra note 83, at 7. 
 223. PRELIMINARY MAYOR’S MGMT. REP., supra note 82, at 72. 
 224. See generally January 14, 2020 Public Meeting Minutes, NYC BD. CORRECTION 
(Jan. 14, 2020), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/boc/downloads/pdf/Meetings/2020/january/minutes-202001.
pdf [https://perma.cc/4L2P-APDU]. 
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(2) timely and quality investigations . . . ; (3) meaningful and adequate 
discipline . . . and (4) reducing violence among Young Inmates.”225  Brann 
and Grossman offered several reasons for the increase in use of force: that 
the new definition of “use of force” adopted through the Consent 
Judgement captures more instances than previously understood to 
actually be “force” by DOC staff, and, therefore, there is ongoing 
confusion;226 that the increased number of cameras in DOC facilities lead 
to the counting of more instances;227 and that, even if use of force rates 
have gone up, the number of incidents resulting in serious injuries have 
gone down and allegations of use of force by incarcerated people have also 
gone down.228  DOC, in concert with the Monitor, devised a plan for the 
review of use of force called the “Intake Squad,” which aims to review all 
incidents within 25 days of their occurrence, complete preliminary 
investigations in a more streamlined process,229 and act in concert with 
attorneys in the Trials Division.230  After almost five years of 
Monitorship, the system remains overwhelmed. 
B. No Minimum Standards 
The BOC has not promulgated Minimum Standards regarding use of 
force, and even if the Board were to promulgate new Minimum Standards, 
it would not have the authority to fire DOC staff or shut down facilities 
for non-compliance.231  However, following the Eighth Nunez Monitor 
Report, BOC did ask DOC to present on the report’s findings.232  Members 
of the Board found DOC’s presentation insincere, as it was inconsistent 
with the overall negative Monitor’s report.233  The Board requested the 
DOC Commissioner herself speak to the Board to answer for the report’s 
 
 225. Ninth Nunez Monitor’s Report, supra note 79, at 4; see also supra note 79 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Southern District of New York’s intervention after 
finding an unconstitutional pattern and practice of excessive force against 16- and 
17-year-olds). 
 226. See January 14, 2020 Public Meeting Minutes, supra note 224, at 37. 
 227. See id. 
 228. See id. at 38. 
 229. See Ninth Nunez Monitor’s Report, supra note 79, at 43–44. 
 230. See id. at 48. 
 231. See supra Section II.B.ii. 
 232. See November 12, 2019 Public Meeting Minutes, NYC BD. CORRECTION (Nov. 12, 
2019), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/boc/downloads/pdf/Meetings/2019/November/minutes-2019
1112.pdf [https://perma.cc/493H-HAPC]. 
 233. See id. at 12. 
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contents.234  Appearing in January 2020, Commissioner Brann and 
General Counsel Grossman contended that the Department was in 
compliance with 85% of the Consent Judgment’s requirements.235  Board 
member Dr. Robert Cohen, after pointing out that some of DOC 
leadership’s “logic [was] impossible to understand,”236 then asked 
whether DOC leadership actually “[has] the capacity” to meet the 
mandates of the Nunez Consent Decree, given rising use of force rates after 
four years of efforts and the apparent training of 10,000 DOC 
employees.237  Dr. Cohen also asked if BOC Board members, the 
Commissioner, and the independent Monitor’s team could view relevant 
video footage of correction officers engaging in use of force, so they could 
bridge the “real disconnect” between DOC staff and the Monitor’s 
understanding of what actually constitutes inappropriate use of force.238 
In January of 2019, BOC issued a report that, among other metrics, 
found there was a 260% increase in the total number of injuries related to 
staff use of force in the last ten years; the numbers went from 1,981 
injuries, in 2008, to 7,139 in 2018.239  This is all despite a 32% drop in the 
 
 234. See id. 
 235. See January 14, 2020 Public Meeting Minutes, supra note 224, at 30; supra note 225 
and accompanying text.  
 236. Id. at 42. The City Council appointed Dr. Robert Cohen to the Board, for the first 
time in 2009, and to a second six-year term in 2017. See Eileen Grench & Rosa Goldensohn, 
Mayor ‘Interfered’ with Jails Overseer on Solitary Confinement, Member Charges, CITY (Oct. 
22, 2019, 10:17 PM), 
https://www.thecity.nyc/2019/10/22/21210740/mayor-interfered-with-jails-overseer-on-s
olitary-confinement-member-charges [https://perma.cc/LPA7-2V32]. Dr. Cohen has 
experience working as a Director of the Montefiore Rikers Island Health Services on 
Rikers Island, among his leadership experience, and has served as a federal court Monitor 
to oversee medical care for incarcerated people in five states, including New York. See 
Board Members, Robert L. Cohen, M.D., NYC BD. CORRECTION, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/boc/about/robert-l-cohen-md.page 
[https://perma.cc/Q3QH-YXV3] (last visited Aug. 24, 2020). 
 237. See January 14, 2020 Public Meeting Minutes, supra note 224, at 43–44. 
 238. See id. at 49. Earlier in the meeting, Brann and Grossman pointed to confusion 
among DOC staff about what constitutes use of force, given the Consent Judgment 
changed the definition to include a broader number of incidents. See id. at 37. During the 
public comments portion of the March 2020 BOC meeting, Sarita Daftary-Steel, 
community organizer with JustLeadership USA, asked the Board to update the 
community on whether this meeting happened. See March 10, 2020 Public Meeting 
Minutes, N.Y.C. DEP’T CORRECTION 137 (Mar. 10, 2020), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/boc/downloads/pdf/2020_03_10_march_board_meeting_mi
nutes_and_transcript_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2N6W-XFUE]. It is unclear whether 
this meeting has occurred since then. 
 239. N.Y.C. BD. OF CORR., SERIOUS INJURY REPORTS IN NYC JAILS: JANUARY 2019, at 
9 (2019), 
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jail population.240  The report also highlighted that DOC was 
underreporting serious injuries — DOC reported approximately 80% 
fewer serious injuries than Correctional Health Services.241  In response to 
these findings, BOC promulgated new Minimum Standards to align 
DOC’s serious injury reporting with Correctional Health Services’ 
reporting.242  Although these new regulations will make sure DOC adheres 
to a more thorough standard of reporting, BOC’s actions only begin to 
tackle the underlying problem of violence — and staff-perpetuated 
violence — that continues to plague New York City jails.  The BOC’s 
response to its serious injury findings highlights the main problem with 
the Agency’s scope of authority and lack of capacity. 
C. Oversight’s Silence on the Use of Force 
i. The Mayor and the Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice 
In 2017, Mayor Bill de Blasio announced his Administration’s plan to 
close Rikers Island, unafraid to call out the violence in New York City 
jails as a major impetus.243  Since then, the focus of the de Blasio 
Administration has been on the future, backing a plan to build four new, 
 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/boc/downloads/pdf/Reports/BOC-Reports/2019.01.07 - BOC 
Serious Injury Report - Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YRG-TLWM]. 
 240. Id. at 3. In general, the report states that most injuries in the jails “were related 
to inmate on inmate fights, followed by use of force (excluding allegations), accidents, and 
‘other.’” Id. at 9. BOC also points out that DOC “[lacked] a single metric from which to 
determine the actual number of serious injuries occurring to people in its custody.” Id. at 
13. 
 241. Id. at 10. It is noteworthy that the health (and mental health) services within New 
York City jails are run independent of DOC. In June of 2015, Correctional Health Services, 
previously overseen by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH), 
became a Division of NYC Health and Hospitals (NYC H+H). See Health and Hospitals 
Corporation to Run City Correctional Health Service, OFF. MAYOR (June 10, 2015), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/383-15/health-hospitals-corporation-run
-city-correctional-health-service [https://perma.cc/6GEZ-VYZ7]; Correctional Health 
Services, NYC HEALTH & HOSPS., 
https://www.nychealthandhospitals.org/correctionalhealthservices/ 
[https://perma.cc/W3HV-26LK] (last visited Aug. 24, 2020)). NYC H+H is a “public 
benefit corporation” created in 1969. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 7384(1) (McKinney 2019). 
This public-private entity touts itself as the “largest public health care system in the 
United States.” About, NYC HEALTH & HOSPS., 
https://www.nychealthandhospitals.org/about-nyc-health-hospitals/ 
[https://perma.cc/A5EL-GQ84] (last visited Aug. 24, 2020). 
 242. See Notice of Adoption of Rules, N.Y.C. BD. CORRECTION 1–2 (2019), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/boc/downloads/pdf/Meetings/2019/July/final-injury-reporti
ng-rule-002.pdf [https://perma.cc/NK2W-ZVUD]. 
 243. See Rose, supra note 41. 
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borough-based jail facilities. 244  Although two jail facilities have closed 
since 2018,245 at de Blasio’s direction, MOCJ has continued to focus on the 
future of incarceration, setting a goal to reduce the capacity for jail 
facilities to around 3,300 people,246 together with a “[change in] culture, 
purpose and location of city jails.”247  However, by only addressing the 
jails of the future, focusing most of their messaging on downward trends 
in jail population,248 and construction plans,249 the Mayor and his 
Administration are ignoring the present violence crisis.  As of now, Rikers 
Island is on track to close in 2026;250 for six more years, people will be 
incarcerated in facilities that have been nearly uninhabitable since they 
first opened,251 subject to unrelenting corrections officer brutality.252  
Further, the Justice Implementation Task Force reports that its Culture 
Change Working group is “conduct[ing] research and develop[ing] 
detailed recommendations” regarding “in-custody violence.”253  Not only 
is this vague, but also the entire Nunez Consent Judgement is a reaction 
 
 244. See MAYOR’S OFF. OF CRIM. JUST., STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2019–2021, at 
9 (2019) [hereinafter STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2019–2021], 
http://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Strategic-Plan-2019
-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9DZ-7WXL]. 
 245. See Sydney Pereira, Brooklyn’s House of Detention Closes Under de Blasio’s New 
Jails Plan, GOTHAMIST (Jan. 3, 2020, 4:51 PM), 
https://gothamist.com/news/brooklyns-house-detention-closes-under-de-blasios-new-jails
-plan [https://perma.cc/PC52-GEWH]; New York Is Leading a Historic Decarceration 
Plan. Our Plan Is to Close Rikers Island and Replace It with a Smaller Network of Modern 
Jails., A ROADMAP TO CLOSING RIKERS, https://rikers.cityofnewyork.us/ 
[https://perma.cc/RR38-479N] (last visited Sept. 17, 2020). A facility slated to close in 
March 2020 had to reopen briefly to house people with COVID-19. See Chelsia Rose 
Marcius, Coronavirus Prompts Reopening of Shuttered Jail on Rikers Island, DAILY NEWS 
(Mar. 23, 2020, 2:08 PM), 
https://www.nydailynews.com/coronavirus/ny-coronavirus-correction-department-reope
n-jail-20200323-dq2bn3hap5g5bkjagjzsmkdxie-story.html [https://perma.cc/6R29-
R9HB]. 
 246. As of March 2020, New York City jails had an average daily population of around 
7,200 people. See Facilities Overview, DEP’T CORRECTION, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doc/about/facilities.page [https://perma.cc/Q3X8-ELQH] (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2020). 
 247. See STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2019–2021, supra note 244. 
 248. See Smaller Safer Fairer: The Jail Population in NYC: Under 6,000 in 2020; 3,300 
by 2026, MAYOR’S OFF. CRIM. JUST. 2 (2019) [hereinafter The Jail Population in NYC], 
https://rikers.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/Rikers-scorecard__NovemberDecem
ber-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NVF-4LKV] (last visited Aug. 24, 2020). 
 249. See id. 
 250. See id. 
 251. See supra Section I.A. 
 252. See supra Section I.C. 
 253. See The Jail Population in NYC, supra note 248, at 3. 
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and an attempt to solve DOC’s broken culture of excessive and 
unnecessary violence.  As the City’s chief executive, the Mayor has 
unfettered authority to tackle the issue of officer use of force in jails today 
— he can fire the DOC Commissioner,254 push for a reduction or 
redirection of funds for DOC’s budget, and possesses the discretion to 
appoint more outspoken members to BOC.  In fact, in October of 2019, 
Mayor de Blasio declined to reappoint BOC board member Bryanne 
Hamill — who was outspoken on the issue of solitary confinement — a 
move seen by advocates as silencing a progressive voice on the Board.255  
By remaining silent on the use of force, however, the de Blasio 
Administration has decided that the everyday reality in the City jails is 
just not their problem. 
ii. New York City Council 
In October 2019, the New York City Council officially voted to close 
Rikers Island and adopted a plan, in concert with the Mayor, to revamp 
the City’s approach to criminal justice and incarceration.256  Although the 
Independent Commission, A More Just New York, is an example of the 
City Council leading on addressing the City’s problematic correctional 
system, the Independent Commission’s report did not specify the ways in 
which DOC should tackle the issue of use of force.257  The Commission 
simply acknowledges systemic violence in City jails,258 and points to the 
ongoing Nunez litigation and 14-point plan on quality staff training as 
antidotes to excessive use of force.259  The Committee on Criminal Justice 
did hold a hearing in February 2020, where it compelled DOC 
Commissioner Brann to testify on the lack of compliance with the Nunez 
Consent Judgment.260  Unfortunately, legislation focused on the future of 
New York jails, and discussion with DOC’s current leadership does not 
address the crisis of violence happening in the jails today.  The Council’s 
 
 254. See supra Section II.B.ii. 
 255. See Reuven Blau & Rosa Goldensohn, De Blasio Ousts Key Solitary Confinement 
Foe as Reform Nears, CITY (Oct. 17, 2019, 5:23 PM), 
https://www.thecity.nyc/2019/10/17/21210752/de-blasio-ousts-key-solitary-confinement-
foe-as-reform-nears [https://perma.cc/GM6R-8TRP]. 
 256. See Rikers to Close, supra note 44. 
 257. See generally A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 162. 
 258. See id. at 13–14. 
 259. See id. at 85–86. 
 260. See Mark Hallum, City Council Presses Corrections Department to Explain Jail 
Violence Spike, AMNY (Feb. 3, 2020), 
https://www.amny.com/politics/doc-provides-nuance-for-uptick-in-violent-incidents-in-j
ail-facilities/ [https://perma.cc/5SVZ-PHAH]. 
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own analysis of the DOC budget notes that, given DOC efforts and the 
monetary investments in tackling the issue of officer perpetrated violence, 
“it is alarming that [use of force] incidents have not been declining.”261  
Council members have the power to pass new legislation around use of 
force and actively seek the reduction or redirection of DOC’s funding. 
iii. Department of Investigation and District Attorneys 
By the end of 2019, only eight other cases were pending with the DOI 
or District Attorneys.262  The Ninth Nunez Monitor writes the slow pace 
with which outside law enforcement considers the cases referred to it has 
repercussions for effective discipline; it is only after referred cases are 
declined that an administrative disciplinary proceeding can begin.263  
Both of these entities have powerful enforcement tools specifically 
designed to hold people accountable for their actions, and yet, when it 
comes to officer use of force, using these tools is a non-priority. 
D. New York State Would Rather Play Politics 
New York State government’s involvement in the day-to-day 
operations of New York City jails can, at best, be described as arbitrary 
and, at worst, as politically motivated.  For example, SCOC issued one 
report detailing the brutal death of an incarcerated person on Rikers 
Island in May of 2017.264  However, the ongoing nature of the systemic 
violence in New York City jails,265 and the number of deaths that have 
occurred in them,266 should warrant far more than only one report, given 
that SCOC has a duty to investigate the deaths of all incarcerated persons 
in New York State.267  Furthermore, the dynamic between Mayor de 
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Blasio and Governor Cuomo seems to be the reason why SCOC comments 
on officer use of force at all.  For example, in February 2018, SCOC issued 
a report detailing, among other facility failures, how correction officers 
killed an incarcerated man in a Rikers’ jail with use of force; the report 
specifically criticized the Rikers Island closure plan as envisioned by the 
de Blasio Administration.268  The report warned that because of the 
“City’s inaction and protracted ten-year proposal,” SCOC would 
“examine steps to expeditiously close Rikers . . . to ensure that the 
constitutional rights of inmates and staff are protected.”269  Later that 
month, SCOC Chairman Thomas Beilein sent a letter to DOC 
Commissioner Brann specifying that housing areas in a facility on Rikers 
Island needed to be “vacated by close of business” due to failures in 
safety.270  The de Blasio Administration stated State action “smacks of 
politics, and not sound policy,” and then sued to block the order.271  The 
housing areas were not vacated and Rikers Island is still very much 
open.272  Given that SCOC, as an oversight body, has the authority to 
close prisons and jails, it is unfortunate that it has not taken bolder action 
to better the conditions for people incarcerated in New York City.273 
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E. Yet Another Oversight Hurdle: Office of Administrative Trials and 
Hearings’ Precedent 
OATH — where disciplinary proceedings for DOC officers occur — is 
an administrative court, and, thus, the ALJs who preside over the 
hearings consider precedent from previous administrative decisions when 
making decisions regarding staff discipline.274  The Ninth Nunez Monitor 
pointed out that OATH disciplinary proceedings’ precedent for DOC 
officers actually runs counter to the goals of the Consent Judgment’s 
requirements for timely and meaningful discipline.275  The Nunez Consent 
Judgment requires the imposition of certain disciplinary outcomes 
regardless of factors, such as the severity of injuries.276  ALJs, however, 
under OATH precedent, would consider factors such as “severity of the 
use of force” or “whether or not the inmate sustained a serious injury” 
when determining what penalty to impose on an officer.277  Thus, the 
Consent Judgment may proscribe certain disciplinary outcomes for a 
particular action that an ALJ at OATH ultimately has the discretion to 
not impose, putting DOC in an “untenable position” to conform to the 
Consent Judgment.278  Therefore, OATH’s imposed penalties result in 
“disciplinary outcomes . . . [that] are not proportionate with Staff 
misconduct,” which “impacts DOC’s ability to impose meaningful 
discipline,”279 a central tenet of the Consent Judgment.  This very tension 
is addressed in the Remedial Order filed by the parties in August 2020.280 
IV. STEPS TO STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT 
Part IV of this Note offers three proposals to meaningfully change 
oversight in New York to effectively address the problem of constant and 
excessive correction officer use of force: (1) increase BOC’s funding, 
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change its composition, broaden its enforcement power, and demand it 
promulgates Minimum Standards with regards to use of force; (2) 
mandate communication between all already existing oversight bodies; 
and (3) move all use of force investigations from within DOC to DOI, and 
tackle the ineffectiveness of OATH precedent when it comes to 
disciplining correction officers.  Although significant hurdles stand in the 
way of actually achieving these goals, like an amendment to the City 
Charter, if instituted, they would positively impact the daily lives of 
incarcerated people who desperately need someone to take impactful 
action now. 
A. Board of Correction: Promulgate Minimum Standards, Make Funding 
Independent, Diversify Composition, and Broaden Enforcement Authority 
BOC must issue Minimum Standards for correction officer use of force.  
These standards can build on the language DOC already agreed to in the 
Nunez Consent Judgment and incorporate language from DOC’s use of 
force policy; for example, the minimum standard can state outright that 
“all Staff have a duty to protect incarcerated people from harm, and have 
a responsibility to intervene to de-escalate confrontations as soon as it is 
practicable and reasonably safe to do so.”281  As long as BOC is charged 
with issuing standards that govern the “care, custody, correction, 
treatment, supervision, and discipline” of people in DOC custody,282 it is 
unclear how use of force can fall outside of its mandate.  Not having these 
Minimum Standards demonstrates that the Agency is operating with 
blinders on and is unwilling to embrace its purpose. 
For these new Minimum Standards to actually make a difference, three 
other changes to BOC are necessary.  First, BOC’s budget needs to be 
independent of the whims of New York City’s budget process.  Richard 
Wolf, former Executive Director of BOC, has argued that “funding has 
been the Board’s Achilles heel.”283  While the New York City budget has 
allocated $1.4 billion to DOC for 2020, it allocated $3.1 million to BOC.  
BOC’s budget, therefore, represents only 0.22% of the total amount of 
money going to DOC.  The City’s investment into oversight outside DOC’s 
structure has to be more significant.  Therefore, much like the 2019 
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amendments to the Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB),284 an 
amendment should be made to the City Charter to directly tie BOC’s 
budget to a percentage — higher than .22% — to DOC’s budget.  With 
this expanded capacity, BOC could hire more staff and more effectively 
be the “eyes and ears” within the City jails.285  If one of the BOC’s main 
purposes is to publicize the everyday reality of incarcerated people, this 
expanded staff could assist in collecting narratives of victims of correction 
officers’ brutality and work to support the promulgation of use of force 
Minimum Standards. 
Second, people who have personally experienced incarceration in New 
York City jails needs to serve on the Board.  This would hopefully give 
the Board more courage to confront DOC and embrace a more adversarial 
approach.  Before 1977, the Mayor appointed all nine members to BOC, 
whereas now, the Mayor appoints three, the City Council appoints three, 
and the Mayor appoints three through nomination from presiding justices 
of two city appellate courts.286  The legislature could make an amendment 
to the City Charter, similar again to the 2019 CCRB amendments,287 to 
change BOC’s composition.  Such an amendment could expand the Board 
by three members, or alternatively replace one of three members that are 
nominated by each branch of government to be selected by the Public 
Advocate with certain requirements attached.  For example, a 
requirement could be that at least one member has spent time 
incarcerated in a DOC facility.  This change would ensure the people most 
affected by incarceration have their voices represented on the Board.  
Then, hopefully, the issues of violence and excessive correction officer use 
of force, which people experience daily in jail, would be discussed more 
openly and frequently.  These new members could inspire BOC to act with 
the urgency the problems require. 
Third, the New York City Charter needs to be amended to give the 
Board explicit enforcement power, such as the unquestionable ability to 
sue DOC, impose penalties, fire key staff members, and close facilities for 
lack of compliance with Minimum Standards.  Professor Michele Deitch, 
in her article “Distinguishing the Various Functions of Effective Prison 
 
 284. See Ballot Questions, CHARTER 2019 NYC (2019), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5bfc4cecfcf7fde7d3719c06/t/5d83de07e707a67e06d
1ad9e/1568923145884/BallotQuestions_English.pdf [https://perma.cc/JG4X-56DQ] 
(asking in Ballot Question 2 to raise CCRB’s funds to increase employee headcount equal 
to 0.65% of the Police Department’s). 
 285. See id. 
 286. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 626(a); supra Section II.B.i. 
 287. See Ballot Questions, supra note 284. 
1434 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVII 
Oversight,” lays out seven core functions that must co-exist in various 
bodies to make for effective oversight: regulation, audit, accreditation, 
investigation, legal reporting, and inspection and monitoring.288  In 
Deitch’s framework, the Board serves a regulatory function when it sets 
Minimum Standards for the treatment of people in DOC custody.  Deitch 
writes governmental entities that exercise the regulation function need to 
be able “to wield a hammer over the correctional agency.”289  Therefore, 
in addition to setting these standards, BOC needs to have “the power to 
enforce . . . standards and policies through . . . the imposition of fines, the 
ability to close an institution, or the ability to hire or fire directors.”290  
Right now, BOC engages primarily in inspection and monitoring.  If BOC 
were to promulgate Minimum Standards for the use of force, with 
expanded enforcement power, it would actually be able to close jail 
buildings where staff continue to violate these standards. 
B. Oversight Actors Should Be Connected 
Part II showed the varied authorities different agencies, institutions, 
and elected officials have over New York City jails — the web of jail 
oversight.291  As Deitch points out, not one institution can “meaningfully 
serve every function” of oversight.292  Thus, one way to improve the 
efficiency and scope of New York City jail oversight would simply be to 
connect all of the players.  The problem of excessive and unnecessary 
officer use of force could become manageable if the powers of each 
oversight actor complemented each other, instead of existing in silos.  For 
example, SCOC and the BOC do not engage in any ongoing 
communication and, therefore, do not act in concert with one another.  
The scope of SCOC’s legal authority is broad,293 but SCOC seems to wield 
this power sparingly.  Further, much of the law that determines the 
SCOC’s power and duties focuses on cooperation with local correctional 
facilities.  However, there is no law that compels SCOC to actively 
communicate with BOC.  If SCOC were required to develop a working 
relationship with BOC, then this could expand the capacity of both 
agencies, provide more unified investigation, and publicize challenges 
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more effectively.  Ideally, SCOC could close a jail facility that BOC points 
out is particularly egregious when it comes to levels of violence. 
C. Move All Use of Force Investigations to Department of Investigation 
and Address Problematic Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings’ 
Precedent 
Oversight must exist outside the closed system which it regulates.  As 
shown consistently through the Nunez Monitor’s Reports, the ID within 
DOC has been unable to effectively investigate use of force incidents.294  
Instead, all use of force investigations — and the necessary expansion of 
investigative staff — should be housed under DOI, an independent 
government agency that already has the authority to take on these 
investigations.295  DOI has the power to refer any investigation to the 
District Attorney for criminal prosecution.296  Once DOI is in charge of 
all use of force investigations, the Agency should also be able to refer cases 
to the non-criminal disciplinary process OATH oversees. 
However, as discussed above,297 there is a discordance between the 
precedent in OATH’s case law and the Nunez Consent Judgment’s goals 
with regards to staff discipline, that the independent Monitor observes “is 
undermining [DOC’s] overall effort to impose meaningful and timely 
discipline.”298  At the same time, another problem is quickly approaching: 
superfluous DOC staff.  The City’s plans to close Rikers Island by 2027 
and replace all jail facilities with four borough-based buildings depends 
on drastically reducing the number of people in jail to an estimated 3,300 
people.299  The hope is that changes to bail laws will accomplish the 
drastic reduction, as judges will no longer be able to set bail amounts for 
lower-level offenses.300  As the City and State’s public health response to 
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COVID-19 came to include releasing people unnecessarily in jail and 
reducing the number of people taken into custody, the jail population in 
New York City has actually gone down to about 4,363.301  DOC needs to 
get rid of an ever-increasing number of superfluous staff.  At the same 
time, there remains an egregious lack of consequences for many officers 
who engage in unnecessary use of force.  Therefore, bolstering the OATH 
process and putting resources into solving the tension between the 
Consent Judgment and OATH precedent serves the dual purpose of 
ensuring proportionate discipline and weeding out staff uncommitted to 
culture change.  The Nunez Remedial Order, filed by the parties in August 
2020, addressed the OATH precedent problem, and required the City to 
“advise all OATH [ALJs] who handle proceedings relating to [use of 
force] violations” of the particular disciplinary outcomes dictated by the 
Consent Judgment within 30 days from the Court’s endorsement.302  
Thus, resolving the issue of OATH precedent and moving all use of force 
investigations to DOI would lead to a more independent and streamlined 
process for disciplining, and potentially prosecuting, problematic DOC 
staff. 
CONCLUSION 
As civil rights attorney Bryan Stevenson stated, “the true measure of 
our character is how we treat the poor, the disfavored, the accused, the 
incarcerated, and the condemned.”303  Despite all of the achievements in 
hard-won court battles and protests that advocates have made,304 prisons 
and jails have always been and will continue to be inhumane places.  With 
time and patient activism, one day, the majority of people in the United 
States may fall out of our collective “love affair with imprisonment.”305 
Abhorrent conditions, brutality, and violence have been a part of New 
York City jails’ history from their inception.306  Prisoners’ rights 
advocates, attorneys, and incarcerated people have been responsible for 
ensuring fundamental rights for those within City facilities.  The Nunez 
Consent Judgement is both a culmination and a necessary accountability 
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measure for DOC and correction officers, but it can only go so far.  To 
truly take a step forward, the oversight entities responsible for setting the 
rules in which the DOC can act must take ownership and responsibility 
for the failures of New York City’s carceral system.  Ultimately, the City 
has adopted a plan to shift the way people are held in detention in the 
City, albeit too slowly.  However, for these plans to have any chance of 
success — plans that purport to do away with DOC’s culture of excessive 
and unnecessary use of force — changes to the web of jail oversight in the 
City need to be made, and these oversight actors need to embrace their 
role in shaping the future. 
Robin Campbell, a former director of media relations for DOC, wrote 
an article providing insight into the changing media narratives around 
what it is like to be incarcerated within New York City jails.307  He 
concludes his article, writing, “[b]laming those who walk a jail’s corridors 
for a ‘culture of brutality’ is too easy.  Responsibility also lies with the 
leaders of these institutions, the politicians who fund and oversee them 
and . . . the citizens of the city, who set the expectations.”308  Although 
shifting the way New York City conducts jail oversight can only happen 
over time and with considerable effort, this Note aims to coalesce 
disparate information and add to the many voices calling out for an end 
to this violence. 
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